Afghanistan GPE Programme (2011-2018)

# Results Documentation Report

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# List of acronyms

ALP - Alternative Learning Programme

CBE - Community Based Education

CA - Coordinating Agency

DEO - District Education Office

EID - Education and Information Division

EIP - Educational Incentive Programme

EMIS - Education Management Information System

EY - Ernst & Young

EQRA - Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GIRoA -Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GPE - Global Partnership for Education

GPEPCU - GPE Programme Coordination Unit

GTA - Grant Thornton Afghanistan

HR - Human Resources

ISD – Infrastructure and Services Department

KPMG - Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler

MBE - Mosque Based Education

MOE - Ministry of Education

MoF - Ministry of Finance

NCE - No-Cost Extension

NESP – National Education Strategic Plan

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

NIEP - National Institute for Educational Planning

OOSC - Out of School Children

PED – Provincial Education Department

PEO - Province Education Office

PMCU -  Project Management and Coordination Unit

PKF - Pannell, Kerr, & Foster (PKF F.R.A.N.T.S. Chartered Accountants)

SE - Supervising Entity

SIP - School Improvement Plan

SM - Social Mobilisation

SMS - School Management Shuras

TLM - Teaching & Learning Materials

TPM – Third Party Monitoring

UNCRC - United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children

UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

USD - United States Dollar

# Executive Summary

## Background and Introduction

This is a Results Documentation Report, written for a broad audience, on the Afghanistan Global Partnership for Education Programme which ran from 2012 to 2018. Sources used in this report's creation include a desk review of programme documents, including reports, and discussions with beneficiaries, programme staff, and stakeholders from relevant organisations (e.g. MoE, UNICEF, co-ordinating bodies).

The Afghanistan GPE Programme has been delivered within a context where the national government faces substantial reach and capacity challenges, poverty and unemployment are widely considered as the greatest causes of an ongoing and escalating conflict, and rule of law is limited. Poverty is widespread (over a third of the population in 2011), and has a significant provincial and gender dimension.

Principal contextual challenges facing the programme have included Security, Access, Equity, Quality, and Management and Administration; these were the challenges facing the country on inception, and continue to today. Insecurity in the south and east of Afghanistan has risen steadily from 2011, and has posed significant challenges for programme implementation. Despite great advances in promoting access to education, demand continues to outstrip supply. Similarly, whilst access to education for girls has greatly improved, gender equity remains an issue. Education quality is a serious challenge, with over two thirds of teaching staff lacking the minimum required teaching qualifications, and around half of children found to be functionally illiterate in grades 2-3 (USAID, 2018). Finally, faced with more immediate economic and security challenges, the focus of government and NGO funding has moved away from education; this has left education management and administration under-resourced and facing substantial continued challenges.

Upon joining the GPE in 2011, Afghanistan was awarded $55.7m USD for 'on-budget' programmes delivered through MoE, with UNICEF acting as the Supervising Entity (SE). The initial timeframe was 2013-2015, but was extended to July 2018 followed by a 10 working days grace period (July 1-15), with MoE returning $5.534m USD of excess funding (est.).

Afghanistan's GPE programme targeted high-need provinces and districts in Afghanistan where the above challenges were most acute, and had four Programme Priorities: strengthening of community/social mobilisation and school governance at the local level; expanding and reinforcing multiple pathways into education; increasing numbers of qualified female teachers in target areas; and streamlining MoE policy and administrative systems.

## Overall Outcomes

Overall, it appears that throughout the Programme, education access and equity has been improved in target districts, and some of these effects promise to persist beyond the programme period. Community engagement in schooling has also improved, as well as school performance. Target schools have safer and more conducive learning environments for pupils, and monitoring of education pathways has also improved. Schools have been reopened, and numbers of female teachers in target areas have grown. Finally, MoE and national education sectors have seen advances in institutional capacity, and national aid coordination mechanisms also seem to have improved.

## Implementation Challenges

The report found a wide variety of challenges were encountered in the course of Programme implementation. These were frequently related to the centralisation or 'on-budget' nature of

programming – for example issues with bureaucratic, policy approval, and financial delays, in-efficiencies due to political challenges (e.g. ministerial turnover), and generally this centralised approach led to many frustrations and delays. Challenges in Programme ownership, with MOE stakeholders seeing it as a standalone Project rather than Afghan National programme, may have underpinned other challenges.

Other potential challenges related to targeting of funds, with an emphasis placed on infrastruc-ture over education quality, and to costings undertaken with limited consultation (resulting in substantial delays and in some cases non-completion of targets).

Another recurrent theme comprised programme monitoring: Afghanistan's highly complex secu-rity-challenged context posed barriers to effective programme monitoring. The GPE programme managed substantial achievements in overcoming these barriers, building a monitoring system which will inform future programmes. However, given the contextual challenges described, some difficulty was experienced in the validation of programme impacts, particularly as they relate to quality of education.

## Recommendations

The report makes many recommendations in different fields. Recommendations relating to pro-gramme management include a strengthened focus on monitoring and evaluation, and impact indicators which have an augmented focus on impact/outcome over outputs. Closely linking funds to achievement is also recommended, along with a management style which plans early and allows for contingencies where possible, and a focus on improving compliance and transpar-ency.

Regarding the programme focus, it is recommended that teaching and learning quality be prior-itised over simply infrastructure and access improvement, as beyond minimum standards, greater value might be ensured on the programme Implementation. Regarding programme de-livery, the report recommends: ensuring local branding, languages, and customs are accounted for in delivery, in order to minimise beneficiary suspicion; greater communication between gov-ernment and aid actors; collaboration with the private sector; and ensuring any future pro-grammes account for the substantial communications, compliance, and transparency challenges present across Afghanistan and its education sector.

# 1 Introduction and Context

## Introduction

This report documents the results of Afghanistan's GPE Programme (3 August 2012 - 15 July 2018). It has been informed by a detailed review of the various reports, documentation, and data generated throughout the Programme's five and a half years of implementation; this desk review has been supplemented by discussions with beneficiaries, and programme staff, in several provinces, as well as stakeholders from the MOE, UNICEF, and other relevant coordinating bodies.

This report is targeted at a broad audience, with limited background knowledge of the GPE Programme; it seeks to supplement, rather than replicate, donor and M&E reports.

The report includes the following sections:

| 1 | Introduction and Context | Brief discussion of the Afghanistan context, highlighting key factors informing the design of the GPE Programme. A headline presentation of the GPE Programme's key priorities, activities, and intended outcomes. |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Priorities, Strategies, and Activities in Detail | Detailed presentation of the Programme's activities as implemented, highlighting shifts from the original programme documents and proposals. |
| 3 | Planning, Implementation, and Oversight | Overview of the plans, systems, and practices that underpinned implementation and oversight of the programme; these are distinct to the programme activities, with this section focusing on background. |
| 4 | Analysis of Programme Results | Exploration of how well the programme performed relative to initial plans and expectations, with analyses of factors underpinning relative success or failure across the different targets. |
| 5 | Financial Report | Analysis of budget and expenditure against target analysis, as well as discussion of how spending differed from initial plans and proposals. |
| 6 | Key Challenges and Lessons Learned | Summary of challenges and lessons learned, with a key focus on informing future delivery of relevant education programmes in Afghanistan. |
| 7 | Key Recommendations | Evidence-informed recommendations for future delivery, with a primary focus on improving access, equity, and quality of education in Afghanistan. |

As this is not an M&E report, the described activities have been structured across key themes and approaches, promoting ease of understanding for the uninitiated reader (rather than mirroring the structure of the original results framework). Additional steps have been taken to structure analyses to better reflect the Programme as implemented, highlighting some of the necessary shifts in focus and approach over the last seven years.

# Context[1]

Afghanistan remains a highly centralised state, with limited local government institutions and civil society/community engagement (e.g. absence of municipal councils), and much of the population does not necessarily trust or consider the involvement of the state as relevant to their concerns at the sub-national level. Government capacity remains limited at both the national and sub-national level, impeding its ability to deliver social services and promote (or provide) good governance. Community-based governance structures face similar challenges.

In a 2009 Oxfam study, over 70% of respondents identified poverty and unemployment as the major driving factors of conflict, with 48% considering corruption, and the ineffectiveness and weakness of government as other critical factors. The study also noted that a prevailing culture of impunity and lack of rule of law were major contributing factors.

Poverty in Afghanistan is characterised by patterns of exclusion and vulnerability that have a strong provincial and gender dimension, and put in evidence the rural-urban divide. In 2011, over 36% of the population lived below the poverty line (a number which has not improved substantially), with more than half the population in a situation of extreme vulnerability, and most with limited access to necessary services.

Over the last decade, Afghanistan has witnessed strong economic growth at an average of 9.4% per year. However, the impact of this growth on poverty reduction and improved living conditions has been uneven. Real gross domestic product growth dropped to 3.7% in 2013 and 1.3% in 2014. Growth has been driven by investments in reconstruction, expansion of services supported by aid, and periodic surges in agricultural production. The transition after 2012 has been challenging, with the withdrawal of most international troops, a decline in foreign aid, and the negative impact on the local economy following the closure of military bases.

# Security Challenges

In 2011, there had already been a steady rise in insecurity across the country, initially in the south and east, and then across areas previously considered safe. This is a trend that continued during the course of Programme implementation, and that had serious implications for the delivery of education services. For example, in many areas, anti-government forces had targeted schools, teachers and students. In 2010 a total of 197 education-related violent incidents were verified throughout the country; 23 incidents affecting education included direct attacks against schools, collateral damage, killing and injury of students and education personnel, threats and intimidation, and forced school closures. These incidents were mostly perpetrated by armed groups (86%), including confirmed attacks by Anti-Government Elements, but also by communal and traditional elements opposed to girls' education. 30% of the incidents were carried out in September 2010, the month of the Parliamentary elections, when half of the polling stations were located in schools.

Attacks have a major negative effect on the delivery of education services and the ability of children to participate, further compounding gender and provincial disparities. Insecurity disproportionately affects women and girls' access to education, with particular targeting of female

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[1] Contents drawn substantially from the original GPE Programme Document and Project Appraisal Document for a new multi-donor programme, entitled Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan (EQRA), unless otherwise cited.

teachers and disproportionate levels of attacks on girls' schools. The security situation also creates problems for education planning, management, infrastructure development, and the deployment of teachers to insecure rural and urban areas.

## Challenges of Access

At the time of application (2011), Afghanistan had made substantial advances in access to education, with a rapid enrolment from less than one million in 2001 to nearly 7.3 million 2010[2]. This has, in part, been improved through the establishment of 9,400 new schools since 2001, when there were only 3,021 schools in the whole country. In the face of high demand and supply constraints, multiple and alternative basic education programmes, such as Community Based Education (CBE) were seen as pathways to promote improved access to education for girls, particularly within remote communities without formal schools.

Nonetheless, demand for education (then and now) outstrips supply; in 2011, the following high-level statistics were highlighted as some of the primary access challenges underpinning design of the GPE programme:

- Community Based Education (CBE) and Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) were responsible for less than 4% of national education enrolment, limiting potential impacts on enrolment;
- 4.2 million eligible children remained out of school in 2011;
- 50% of the schools mentioned in the report (12,421 in 2011)[3] were without usable buildings, boundary walls, safe drinking water or sanitation facilities;
- Anticipated pupil-teacher-ratio increases of nearly 100% in the event of expected enrolment increases;
- Long walking distances to school and lack of safe/proper learning environments; and
- 450 formal schools were still closed or had been damaged in the 2010-2011 period.

Such were the challenges, many of which remain, at the time of the GPE Programme creation.

## Challenges of Equity

Equity for girls in education was another area where substantial strides had been made leading up to the creation of the GPE Programme. In 1999, there were no girls attending schools in the country (according to official reports); by 2011 there were c. 3m girls in some form of basic education, comprising 40% of total enrolment (Afghanistan MOE, 2012). However, challenges in equity for girls remained throughout the country:

- 3.7 million including 60% girls are out of school children (OOSC) are (Out of School Children Report - 2018);
- In 200 of 412 urban and rural districts, no female students were enrolled in grades 10-12;
- 245 out of 412 urban and rural districts do not have a single qualified female teacher;
- 90% of qualified female teachers were located in the nine major urban centres; and
- Enrolment of girls past mid-primary-level declined dramatically (a difference of c. 20% between each grade from 4-6).

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[2] In General Education, Islamic Education, Technical Vocational Education and Training, and Teacher Education.
[3] Figure drawn from GPE Programme Document

## Challenges of Quality

Across the preceding advances in access and equity, one area continues to remain a challenge in the education sector: education quality. Teachers were broadly unqualified, particularly in CBE and ALP, many holding little more education than the children in their classes (Puras, 2016). One recent the United Stated Agency for international Development (USAID) funded literacy assessment (undertaken in three provinces) found that c. 50% of children are functionally illiterate in grades 2-3 (USAID, 2018). While these figures are not from the period of programme inception, it is not likely standards will have improved much since 2011. Other challenges in programme quality highlighted in 2011 included:

- 68% of teachers lacked the minimum required qualification of grade 14 graduation;
- 50% of educational institutions did not (and still do not) have usable buildings;
- There was (and still is) a shortage of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, as well as problems with the timely distribution of purchased materials and procured textbooks; and
- Multiple shifts had reduced the hours of instruction below international norms and affected the quality of education delivery.

## Challenges of Management and Administration

Within such a context of economic and physical insecurity, education was not a priority of the government, or even of many international donors, comprising only a small portion of the total aid spend in Afghanistan. In 2011, the Ministry of Education employed 67% of the civil servants in the country with 15% of the national recurrent budget allocated for education. Education spending in the years since has declined as a proportion of Government spending and is heavily dependent on donor aid. As of 2014, the education sector accounted for 14.1% of total government expenditure (excluding debt service), 15.7% of government recurrent expenditure, 9.9% of development expenditure, and 3.8% of GDP (Puras, 2016). And, although the Government education budget increased in absolute terms between 2010 and 2015, the share of education spending declined from 25% to 13% over the same period.

The government also faced challenges with management and administration. MOE staff had low capacity, particularly at sub-national levels (Province and District); this was coupled with an insufficient number of trained directors, managers, and school principals to develop and maintain an effective decentralised service delivery mechanism. In addition, untrained staff were managing complicated and lengthy procurement processes and were required to manage information and communications within a weak system. Many of these challenges remain.

Within this set of challenges, much education delivery in the country (particularly within rapidly growing CBE and ALP modalities) was implemented by NGOs, largely out of view of the government, and even of other international partners. This resulted in widely varying standards and approaches, efficiency challenges, and occasionally duplicated inputs.

The result of these, and many other challenges, was a disjointed approach to education in Afghanistan, with myriad actors endeavouring to achieve improvements in access, equity, and quality using their own approaches, systems, and priorities.

## Summary Overview of Afghanistan's GPE Programme 2012-2018

As indicated in Afghanistan's Education Interim Plan (EIP) from 2011, Afghanistan's admission to membership of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) was a great source of national pride and was seen as a critical milestone in the development of the education sector in Afghanistan. It was seen to represent a significant international endorsement of

the plans of the Government of Afghanistan to achieve the goals of Education for All (EFA) and a vote of confidence in the capacity of Afghanistan's Ministry of Education to lead the successful execution of those plans. Afghanistan's National Education Strategic Plan (NESP 2) is ambitious, while the EIP that served as the basis for the country's entry into the GPE was more pragmatic, seeking to create a realistic and targeted plan for improving the national education situation, drawing on the support of the international community.

Seeking to address many of the above challenges, Afghanistan's GPE Programme was developed in consultation with the MOE, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and a variety of stakeholders from development and civil society organisations. The GPE awarded $55.7m USD for 'on-budget' programmes to be delivered through the MOE with the support of the developing partners and the variety of NGOs operating in Afghanistan. UNICEF was selected as the 'Grant Agent[4]' by the local education group; UNICEF's functions as SE comprise the two principal elements: the programmatic and the fiduciary. The programmatic component of the SE role includes provision of expert assistance to the MOE and its implementing partners to monitor progress in programme implementation, to evaluate on-going programme achievements, and to provide 'real time' lessons learning capability. Also, included in the programmatic function is reviewing programmatic reports prepared by the MOE and engaging with the MOE in any appropriate follow-up to those reports.

UNICEF discharged the fiduciary component of the SE role by designing the funding modalities of the GPE Programme in such a way that a sound control environment was created, transaction costs were minimized, and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) captured the benefits of other mechanisms already in place to support the education sector in Afghanistan.

The GPE Programme was initially intended to run from 2012-2015 but a variety of challenges resulted in three no-cost extensions, and one grace period spending extension; the programme is on track to close all spending by 15 July 2018 (with a commitment close of June 2017), with the MOE returning c. 5.534USD of unspent fund.

## GPE Programme Priorities and Strategic Activities

Afghanistan's GPE Programme undertook to address challenges in access, equity, and quality through four Programme Priorities, each comprising a series of mutually reinforcing strategic activities. The GPE programme adopts a 'convergence' approach, meaning that all four of the programme priorities are being implemented in the same districts, for maximum impact. Strategies include community and social mobilisation; relations and links between social mobilisers and communities; a common policy. Please note that the below activities have been structured for ease of presentation and understanding, and do not necessarily conform to the project results framework or budget structure. The Programme Priority summaries were drawn from the original Programme Document.

| Priority 1 | Strengthening community and social mobilisation and governance systems at the local level |
|---|---|

Community support and involvement have proven to be determining factors in school enrolment and attendance. In Afghanistan, the development of **School Management Shuras** (SMS), modelled on traditional community-based structures, has proven to be particularly effective. The formulation and implementation of **School Improvement Plans** (SIPs), including maintenance of schools, through the SMS was expected to yield rapid results.

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[4] Formerly known as Supervising Entity.

By involving communities, especially the elders, and religious and community leaders, in promoting the school as a protected environment and zone of peace, education is positioned as an essential building block towards broader national peace and reconciliation.

| | Strategy | | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| ➤ | **Strategy 1.1:** Enhance community and social mobilisation | ✖ | Recruitment, training and deployment of community-based social mobilisers |
| | | ✖ | Development of strategies and approaches to align national stakeholders' communication and mobilisation strategy |
| ➤ | **Strategy 1.2:** Strengthen school governance for quality schools | ✖ | Training and strengthening of SMS |
| | | ✖ | Funding and implementation of SIPs |

| Priority 2 | Expanding and reinforcing multiple pathways to education |
|---|---|

Alternative approaches to education are often the solution where formal systems fail. They allow the flexibility necessary to tailor solutions to local realities. The three selected approaches, CBE, ALP, and Mosque-Based Education (MBE), have already proven successful in getting more children, especially girls, into schools. Direct community involvement and ownership, an intrinsic part of the alternative approaches, was continued as it was critical to the success and sustainability of these efforts.

Priority is given to facilitating bridges between formal and non-formal systems. To the extent possible, formal schools served as hub schools and supported the newly-established CBE and ALP classes. Under-served areas were identified jointly by District Education Offices (DEOs) and Social Mobilisers to ensure a needs-based approach. Wherever possible, community teachers were identified from the same villages, employed, and trained. The GPE programme priority also aimed to reopen 300 of the 450 schools currently closed due to insecurity by mobilising the community and by providing a transition fund to cover the running costs of the school pending its reintegration into the regular system.

| | Strategy | | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| ➤ | **Strategy 2.1:** Expand access to CBE and ALP | ✖ | Needs assessment, opportunity mapping, identification and selection of new CBEs and ALPs in target areas |
| | | ✖ | Training of new CBE and ALP instructors with INSET I[5] |
| | | ✖ | Provision of salaries, textbooks[6], and teaching & learning materials (TLM) |
| | | ✖ | Needs assessment, opportunity mapping, identification and selection of new MBE providers |

[5] This is the MOE's standard in-service teacher training package; this is the minimum qualification requirement for all teachers in the country, and comprises the first of six sequential, and progressively more advanced, training packages.

[6] Procurement of textbooks was not considered in the GPE programme and budget. However, the MoE (through USAID funding) procured and distributed textbooks to general education students, including some of the GPE supported students.

| | Strategy 2.2: Strengthen mosque-based education (MBE) | ✄ | Training of MBE Mullahs in pedagogy and teaching basic reading and numeracy skills. |
| | | ✄ | Provision of incentives, textbooks[7], and TLM |
| | Strategy 2.3: Reopen schools | ✄ | Needs assessment, identification and selection of formal schools to be reopened |
| | | ✄ | Provision and administration of funds to reopen schools, primarily acquisition of furniture and re-habilitation of facilities |

| Priority 3 | Increasing the number of qualified female teachers in areas with high gender disparities |
|---|---|

Given the strong correlation between the number of female teachers and the number of girls attending school, and given that female teachers are especially scarce in the target provinces, the third GPE programme priority focused on increasing the number of female teachers in insecure, rural, and remote districts.

The two strategies identified to increase female teachers in such districts are: (i) to use a system of incentives to encourage female teachers from urban areas to go and work in districts without female teachers; and (ii) to support accelerated and simultaneous teacher training for adolescent girls in the targeted districts.

| | Strategy | | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Strategy 3.1: Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level | ✄ | Social mobilisers work closely with communities to provide material and social support for female teachers in target areas |
| | Strategy 3.2: Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level | ✄ | Selection of qualified, skilled teachers for redeployment from urban to remote schools |
| | | ✄ | Incentivising redeployed urban teachers to stay in rural schools |
| | Strategy 3.3: Develop a system for recruitment, training and employment of female teachers at the local level | ✄ | Teacher training for adolescent girls |
| | | ✄ | Provision of training for new teachers with INSET I |

| Priority 4 | Streamlining policy and administrative systems in the Ministry of Education |
|---|---|

Strengthening the education system capacity in policy review, budget management, and administrative functions has been important on the Government's agenda. Capacity building of the education system was envisioned through: (i) building a system of policies, procedures, and standards; (ii) increasing the capacity and sustainability of the MOE's human resources in planning and monitoring; and (iii) strengthening the coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE. In addition, planning, monitoring, and evaluation was planned to be

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[7] Ibid.

strengthened and gradually decentralised by building capacity at province and district levels. The Education Management Information System (EMIS) required strengthening with a focus on effectiveness and relevance. Taking into account the potential difficulties posed by the security situation in the selected provinces and districts, the design of the GPE programme included a number of mitigation strategies. Ensuring the prior support of elders, local and religious leaders were crucial prior to starting work on the first three programme priorities in any given district.

| | Strategy | | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| ➤ | **Strategy 4.1:** Enhance policy review and development | ✕ | Hiring of consultants to support MOE in development of four policies: Social Mobilisation Strategy; CBE Outreach Policy; Early Education Development Policy; and Female Teacher Relocation Policy |
| ➤ | **Strategy 4.2:** Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring | ✕ | Development of cadre of MOE master trainers to deliver training in education planning and management |
| | | ✕ | Master trainer delivery of training to DEOs and PED in education planning and management |
| | | ✕ | Strengthening of EMIS systems to better monitor the education sector |
| ➤ | **Strategy 4.3:** Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE | ✕ | Creation of the GPE Programme Coordination Unit in the central MOE to administer Programme implementation within the government |

# GPE Programme Target Outcomes

Across the preceding strategic priorities and activities, the Programme sought to achieve the following outcomes:

| Primary Outcome | Indicators |
|---|---|
| The overall outcome of the GPE Programme is increased (15%), sustained and equitable access to education (15%) in the target districts. | Enrolment, attendance, and dropout rates; increased survival rate to Grade 5 (by age and gender). |

| Sub-Outcome | Indicators |
|---|---|
| Increased community engagement in and around schools in targeted districts. | SMS members represent a diverse range of community members; male to female ratio of SMS; community contributions to the school (monetary and in kind; support to female teachers). |
| Improved school performance in targeted districts. | Increased access and retention especially for girls in targeted schools; number of SIPs developed and implemented; positive community perception about school performance. |
| Schools in targeted districts have safer, conducive learning environments for children. | Number of targeted schools with school buildings that are improved and maintained; with boundary walls where needed; with water and sanitation (including latrines); with health- |

| | |
|---|---|
| | related and hygiene activities; with child-centred and participatory teaching and learning; positive community perceptions about the school. |
| Improved monitoring of multiple pathways to education in targeted districts. | Number of monitoring visits made to CBE, ALP and mosques; CBE, ALP and MBE mapping system developed and updated; number of shared activities between clustered schools; number of children entering government schools from CBE, ALP and mosques. |
| Increased number of reopened closed schools in targeted districts. | Number of closed schools that are reopened; number of SMS constituted for these schools; number of plans for utilisation of emergency funds developed and implemented; reduced average time for reopening schools. |
| Increased number of female teachers in targeted districts. | Number of qualified female teachers teaching in targeted districts; number of deployed female teachers; increased retention of female teachers in targeted districts; number of locally recruited teachers; male/female teacher ratio; student/teacher ratio by gender. |
| MOE empowered in policy development, planning and management, EMIS and data collection and analysis, internal and external coordination, and resource mobilisation. | Policy framework developed and implemented in relation to 3 first Programme Priorities; number of individualised district education plans responsive to local needs and contexts; number of DEOs and PEDs engaged with NGOs on the 3 first GPE Programme Priorities; integration of multiple surveys in MOE architecture; PMCU established and active; involvement of different MOE Departments in GPE Programme. |
| Improved aid effectiveness and resource mobilisation in Afghanistan. | Alignment of donor programmes with EIP; cross-fertilisation and synergy among donor programmes; increased resources for education. |

# GPE Programme Target Areas

The GPE Programme targeted high-need provinces and districts in Afghanistan; areas of the country facing particular challenges in security, as well as educational access, equity, and quality. The criteria for selection comprised: (i) low access rates in primary education, (ii) need to overcome traditional obstacles to enrolment through alternative approaches, (iii) need to take affirmative action in favour of girls' education, and (iv) need to continue to build the capacity of the MOE to deliver quality education services in the target areas. 40 districts[8] in the following 13 provinces were covered:



1. Badghis
2. Ghor
3. Daikundi
4. Farah
5. Nimroz
6. Helmand
7. Kandahar
8. Zabul
9. Uruzgan
10. Patika
11. Khost
12. Paktia
13. Nuristan

**Legend**

GPE Program Provinces

☐ GPE Program Province

GPE Program Districts

☐ GPE Program District

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Creation date: 12-2-2017 | Map Doc: Afg GPE Mapping 2017_02_12.sgs | Sources: UNICEF

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[8] Initial programme plans proposed 55 districts.

# 2  Priorities, Strategies, and Activities in Detail

This section aims to describe the activities undertaken and the rationales underpinning their design; the descriptions herein are intended to provide a summary overview, offering sufficient detail to gain an accurate (though not comprehensive) understanding of the GPE Programme. This section also outlines key changes and revisions introduced to the programme during its implementation.

## Programme Priority 1: Strengthen community and social mobilization and governance systems at the local level

### Strategy 1.1: Enhance community and social mobilization

#### Development and Strengthening of Social Mobilisation (SM) Capacity

Social mobilisation, as envisioned in the original programme document, comprised a focus on achieving changes within 'communities and leaders/elders and their attitudes to schooling and education. The objective is to strengthen community and social mobilisation with a view of addressing sociocultural and political barriers to education; developing greater understanding of and support specifically for girls' education; increasing school enrolment and performance, particularly for girls; and ensuring social support and a protective environment in and around the schools.' Two levels of Social Mobilisers were recruited: District Social Mobilisers (DSMs), responsible for the village-level engagement and mobilisation of stakeholders; and Provincial Social Mobilisation Coordinators (PSMs), intended to serve as the primary overseer of the district coordinators' activities, and key liaison to other provincial, district, and central government bodies.

#### Development of Training Materials and Guidelines for SM

Original programme documents specified use of the Second Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP II)[9] social mobilisation guidelines and training materials, supplemented to include tasks related to the GPE Programme. In the end, materials were internally developed by the Academic Supervision Department, supported by the Social Mobilisation Department. Training was the same for both district and provincial social mobilisation staff recruited for the GPE programme; delivery was undertaken across 4 days, with covered topics including: needs assessments, problem definition, identifying appropriate solutions; teambuilding; the UNCRC; Afghanistan's 2012 CBE policy; effective internal and external communication; conflict resolution; effective monitoring and data collection; report writing; effective community mobilisation and participation. The programme was intended to include a combination of theoretical exercises, practical, and role play exercises, seeking to prepare social mobilisers for what they would encounter in the field.

#### Recruitment of On-the-Ground (District) and Provincial Social Mobilisers

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[9] EQUIP II was an on-budget education programme implemented by the MOE, managed by the World Bank and funded through Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which undertook similar Social Mobilisation activities to those required in the GPE programme. In the interest of efficiency and building on the lessons learned from delivery that predated the GPE Programme, Programme designers envisioned making use of EQUIP's existing materials and guidelines for staff development.

It was intended that these staff be recruited largely from target communities, and that they have strong understanding of local customs, social and political dynamics, and needs. In response to challenges encountered in funnelling recruitment through Provincial mechanisms, recruitment of District and Provincial Social Mobilisers was shifted to central MOE processes and systems, led by the Human Resources (HR) department. Many of the DSMs were from main population centres within the target areas, rather than the target communities themselves, with DSMs commuting to remote areas (often by motorcycle, foot, and even donkey) to undertake mobilisation activities.

### Training and Orientation of Social Mobilisers

In the original programme documents, NGOs were expected to deliver social mobilisation training, building on their substantial experience and expertise in social mobilisation in the target areas, and reducing costs associated with central delivery of training, or travel of trainees to Kabul. Initial mentoring and orientation was also intended to fall within this remit. However, revisions to the programme in its early stages, building on the creation of the Social Mobilisation Department at the MOE, transferred this remit to the central government, with training delivered by the Social Mobilisation Department in Kabul for all recruits.

### Social Mobilisation Activity in Target Communities

One Provincial Social Mobilisation Coordinator was recruited for each target province. Initially, three District Social Mobilisers were recruited per targeted district; the quantity per district was reduced to two in 2016-2017, seeking to make funds stretch further into the multiple no-cost extensions.

Original programme documents described heavy involvement of NGOs in social mobilisation activity; the extensive NGO knowledge of the context, and their experience of previous social mobilisation, were cited as primary reasons for this. However, this was shifted in the early phases of the programme, with Social Mobilisers not engaging with NGOs in most target areas.

In initial programme documents, it appears that Social Mobilisation was envisioned to require substantial persuasive advocacy on the part of staff. Where persuasive mobilisation and advocacy was required, Social Mobilisers enumerated the community-level benefits of education (for both boys and girls), or sought to minimise concerns that the GPE Programme was political in nature. In other cases, they offered clarity on curriculum content, reassuring families that teaching and learning would be undertaken in alignment with local customs, norms, and religious values.

While some persuasive advocacy does appear to have been required, the Social mobilisers' role in many target communities appears to have been one of programmatic awareness raising, identification of interested communities, and liaising with the government to ensure GPE programme delivery was undertaken to standard (including acting as an unofficial inspector for construction and education quality), while endeavouring to promote beneficiary voices with the provincial government.

### Regular Meetings with Key Stakeholders at Coordination Level

This set of meetings was meant to incorporate all interested coordinating stakeholders, including NGOs, Provincial Education Departments (PEDs), District Education Offices (DEOs), and the GPE-specific staff. Bi-monthly provincial meetings took place pre-2016; these were to cover topics related to monitoring of ongoing delivery, sharing of information and lessons learned, communication of directives and instruction from central

bodies, and any other matters required for the effective coordination of the Programme. However, liquidity[10] challenges, and questions surrounding attendance and the necessity of such large budgets for meetings, limited such meetings prior to 2016, and resulted in a shift to quarterly meetings thereafter. This shifted to quarterly orientation and review workshops in Kabul in 2016 and covered the intended topics.

### ➤ Development of National MOE Communications Strategy

The Communications Strategy is intended to provide a guiding framework to improve internal and external communication and information sharing practices at the MOE. It began with a mapping exercise, seeking to understand what standards and systems currently exist at the MOE, incorporating a gap analysis, leading to the design of a comprehensive approach to communication. In broad terms, the strategy is meant to support in the definition of who can communicate what, to whom, and with what level of authorisation; it also seeks to recommend systems and practices to facilitate communication and coordination within the MOE itself (from the central to provincial and district levels), as well as with national and international partners.

### Strategy 1.2. Strengthen school governance for quality schools

The original programme document envisioned Strategy 1.2 would accomplish the following: *'[This] strategy will address community involvement in school governance through the development and implementation of School Improvement Plans (SIPs). The objective here is to mainstream and implement a concept of quality education at the school level that involves the physical school environment as well as effective learning, safety and protection, health, water and sanitation, participation and equity, and management. SIPs were designed to be the key mechanisms to rally communities, teachers, and students around the delivery of quality education at the local level'*. This component, because it sought to work with existing formal schools rather than establishing new ones, did not engage in the formation of new Shuras.

### ➤ Training of School Management Shuras (SMSs) in Effective Administration

School Management Shuras received training developed in consultation with the GPE Programme Coordination Unit (GPEPCU), the Infrastructure Services Department (ISD), with support of the GPE-funded engineering staff, and the Social Mobilisation Department. The programme was delivered by both provincial Engineers[11], and by District Social Mobilisers, and covered: the application and evaluation process for SIPs, effective maintenance of works post-delivery, and other topics related to delivery and administration of School Improvement Plans.

### ➤ School Improvement Plans (SIPs) and Implementation

The SIP process passed through several stages in the course of the programme.

### ✖ Social Mobilisers Identify Target Communities

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[10] See later discussions of delays in required audits.

[11] The Infrastructure and Services Department hired a number of engineers dedicated to the GPE Programme; their primary responsibilities included supporting in needs assessments and feasibility studies, as well as undertaking regular monitoring and verification of works.

This was initially meant to incorporate NGO input and support, but responsibility for this activity fell completely within the remit of the Social Mobilisers. Social Mobilisers liaised with the Provincial and Central Planning Directorates to identify candidate schools, and then deployed to communities to identify those with the appropriate conditions and interest for SIP implementation. These criteria are described as: presence within one of the target areas of the programme; presence of an appropriately structured, trained, and committed SMS; presence of an existing school facility requiring SIP-eligible works.

## Evaluation of Applications, Launch of Procurement Process

Social Mobilisers collated applications from various communities, and submitted them for review to the ISD; applications received both thematic and technical feasibility assessments, ensuring local conditions met GPE Programme requirements, and that requested construction projects were both needed and would not be prohibitively expensive. Further to this set of evaluations, PED and DEO representatives would go with SMs to target communities to confirm interest and commitment to maintaining school facilities. Such evaluations included the participation of ISD engineers, or the dedicated GPE Engineers.

## Administration and Monitoring of Implementation

Once a SIP was approved, it would then be put to tender through the central government's procurement and financial systems. Commissioning of work was initially intended to be undertaken and overseen by local communities, under the auspices of the SMS; this was intended to decentralise administration and implementation, minimising the various risks and challenges that arise in complex, distant central government procurement exercises. However, the decision was taken early in the programme to shift contracting to the central government, minimising the involvement of local communities in this process. Oversight of SIP implementation was also shifted away from communities and SMSs to the ISD and, in addition, to the Social Mobilisers. Similar steps were taken with the concept of cost sharing with local communities; contrary to the original programme document, no formal cost sharing arrangements were made with local communities in the implementation of the SIPs.

SIPs focused on improving the quality of educational infrastructure in the target areas. Eligible projects comprised:

- Solar electric system installation;
- Toilet construction;
- School surrounding wall construction;
- Water supply (wells); and
- Desks and chairs.

Project budgets were limited to a cap of c. $30,000 USD per construction/rehabilitation project with an average across all works of c. $18,282 USD; this was revised upward from average c. $10,000 USD due to cost underestimates and concerns regarding multiple no-cost extensions.

As the SIP work was being undertaken, Social Mobilisers and Engineers undertook the role of SIP delivery monitoring and verification, as their frequent presence in target communities provided many opportunities not offered by ISD or other GPE Programme staff. When necessary, ISD staff also undertook regular visits to monitor SIP implementation in the field.

# Programme Priority 2: Expand and reinforce multiple pathways to education

**Strategy 2.1: Expand Access to Community-based Education (CBE) and Accelerated Learning programmes (ALP)**

CBEs and ALPs comprise two of the core means by which educational access in Afghanistan is expanded to remote and impoverished areas, with particularly positive outcomes for girls across programmes predating the GPE programme. Establishing CBEs classes is an outreach mechanism of the formal education system targeting rural and isolated communities; children aged 7-9 are eligible to participate, with the curriculum running from grade 1-3. ALPs endeavour to support older pupils who have over aged, or who have never attended school with focus on over age girls in the communities; provision covers grades 1-6 in three years of study (two grades in one year consecutively with no time off during the year). In both cases, provision is offered only in communities more than 3km walking distance from a formal school and are delivered in whatever space is both available and suitable – Mosques, outdoor spaces, even peoples' homes are used. Activities were intended to be undertaken in accordance with the MOE's CBE Transition Plan and CBE policy guidelines.

➤ **CBE and ALP Opportunity and Needs Mapping, Social Mobilisation**

Needs assessments were initially intended to work closely with NGOs, building on their knowledge of the context and existing relationships; given that much CBE and ALP provision is supported by NGOs, rather than the government, such an approach was also thought to minimise risk of overlapping or duplicate provision. However, responsibility for this activity fell within the remit of the Social Mobilisers and central government.

According to the Social Mobilisation Department, the mapping tool was deployed continuously between 2013 and 2016 by Social Mobilisers across their districts, with a survey undertaken in candidate villages. The survey, and subsequent selection criteria, focused on the following:

- Communities have expressed a desire for a CBE or ALP programme;
- The community is over 3km from the nearest formal school;
- The candidate location is relatively free of hazards and security challenges for children walking to class;
- A minimum of 20 children for ALP and 25 children for CBE are expected to participate in the programme; and
- The community, and its leaders, are committed to the ongoing support of a CBE or ALP classes.

Where an appropriate location is selected, the community would then be asked to nominate a CBE/ALP instructor; this person would then be given an exam at the PED to ensure they meet minimum standards. If the exam was passed, the candidates would then be eligible to receive relevant methodological training and support.

➤ **Teacher Training**

Training was intended to happen prior to the opening of new CBE and ALP classes, however underestimates in the costs of training delivery resulted in some classes being open for up to three years before teachers received training. Training was intended to use In-service Training (INSET) I[12] package of the Teacher Education Department (TED).

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[12] This is the MOE's standard in-service teacher training package; this is the minimum qualification requirement for all teachers in the country, and comprises the first of six sequential, and progressively more advanced, training packages.

The standard module is delivered over 14 days, and covers topics relating to methods, pedagogy, and subject knowledge; however, given challenges faced in budget under-estimates, the programme was truncated to 3-4 days, and covered teaching methods and lesson planning, with no qualification issued at programme end. Field monitoring by Grant Thoranton Afghanistan (GTA), GPE Programme Fiduciary Advisory, also undertook to establish whether teachers had received subject knowledge training as part of this programme; it appeared subject knowledge comprised a key component of support they received.

➤ **Provision of Teaching and Learning Materials, School Kits, Salaries**

Teaching and learning materials were also provided to supported CBEs and ALPs, in the form of:
- MOE standards and guidelines for primary teachers;
- Distribution of grade-appropriate national curriculum textbooks primarily covering literacy and numeracy (MoE was able to provide textbooks to some of the GPE supported students, despite providing textbooks was not considered in the GPE programme and funding); and
- Provision of school kits (for teachers, classes and students) to almost all classes.

CBE and ALP teachers were also entitled to a salary of $150 USD per month, payable through central MOE financial systems and processes, with disbursals made directly to a bank account nominated by the instructor.

**Strategy 2.2: Strengthen Mosque-based Education (MBE)**

Mosque-based Education (MBE) was not a new phenomenon at the outset of the GPE programme; it was, and remains, a widely-accepted approach to education, primarily for boys, throughout Afghanistan. The GPE programme undertook to build on existing practices and institutions, expanding access and strengthening quality of provision in MBE in the target areas.

➤ **Needs Assessment, Social Mobilisation with Mullahs and Communities**

Social mobilisers identified supportive Mullahs in the target areas, using the same mechanisms used to identify CBE and ALP opportunities. Initial Programme design required these Mullahs to be vetted by provincial police and Ministry of Interior representatives prior to hire; however, this requirement was revised in 2015 due to personal security concerns on the part of many candidates.

➤ **Pedagogy, Protection Training for Mullahs**

Selected Mullahs were meant to receive the standard INSET I training package, delivered by the (TED); this module is meant to be delivered over the course of 7-10 days, and covers topics relating to methods, pedagogy, and subject knowledge. However, Mullahs also received the truncated 3-4 day version, covering only planning and teaching methods. Similar to CBE and ALP instructor training, training was delayed for approximately 3 years after MBE centres began receiving other supports.

➤ **Provision of Incentives, and Teaching and Learning Materials to MBE Centres**

Materials provided to MBEs comprised early years' education (kindergarten) workbooks, covering basic literacy and numeracy (e.g. letters and numbers). The main purpose of the MBE classes was to familiarize children with preliminary learning lessons required

for easy entrance to primary grade. MBEs were not linked to any of the formal schools such as CBE/ALP. Mullahs were paid an incentive of $50 USD per month (revised upward from $15 in 2013) for their delivery of programming.

## Strategy 2.3: Reopen schools

Following 2001, numerous formal schools were built and managed by the central government. However, as the conflict exacerbated, many of these schools were forced to close, either because of the fighting, or because of a diversion of government resources away from education and toward security. The GPE Programme sought to take advantage of this existing but disused infrastructure, minimising the need to build new schools from scratch, and working within communities where demand for education had previously been established. Additional steps were taken to re-employ many of the same teaching staff, further minimising the need for substantial staff development costs.

### ➤ Needs Assessments, Opportunity Identification

In the original programme plans and documents, NGOs were intended to support the identification of schools for reopening; however, this responsibility transitioned to Planning and Social Mobilisation Departments in the early phases of the project.

Social Mobilisers liaised closely with the General Directorate of Planning and Evaluation and the PEDs to identify candidate schools and communities. Mobilisers were then deployed to target areas to survey needs and confirm the presence of the closed school. Once an appropriate school was identified, Provincial Academic Supervisors, PED representatives, and Social Mobilisers would undertake a workshop with community representatives (community influential and elders), establishing interest in reopening of the school and securing commitments for ongoing support, and that the school was closed for over six months. Selection of schools to reopen was broadly undertaken on a first-come-first-serve basis beyond this point.

### ➤ Emergency School Reopening Fund

Once again, original Programme plans identified NGOs as the primary administrator of these funds, working closely with communities and SMSs to reopen identified schools; this responsibility transitioned to the General Directorate of Planning and Evaluation and the Social Mobilisation Department.

Selected schools were eligible to receive $4,500 USD in support for eligible works (disbursed over nine months). Eligible support was initially limited to rehabilitation of school buildings (e.g. repair of roofs and walls, paint, carpets, etc.); however, a high proportion of closed schools were found to not have any buildings, so the decision was taken to allow these schools to spend funds on other materials like blackboards, solar lamps, teaching learning materials, and school kits.

Procurement in this case was undertaken by the PED, with delivery validated by Social Mobilisers and independent monitors through regular visits and submission of photos.

# Programme Priority 3: Increase the number of qualified female teachers in areas with high gender disparities

The recruitment and retention of female teachers has been demonstrated by a variety of research to be a primary driver of female enrolment and achievement in relevant contexts (UNESCO, 2008); to this end, the Programme planned the following activities: placing experienced, better-educated, and more effective teachers from urban areas in rural communities with high gender disparity; incentivising them to stay; and training a cadre of bright young female students to serve as the next generation of teachers.

## Strategy 3.1. Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level

### Social Support System for Female Teachers in Rural Areas

As stated by the programme document: *'This strategy is going to be realised through the development and implementation of a social support strategy to ensure that the new teachers (from the urban centres and at the local level) have a solid base for care, assistance and encouragement. This will entail housing; provision of psychosocial support; engaging communities, SMS, and support from community leaders and elders etc. Again, social mobilisers will play a key role in mobilising community support. This will also include consultation with girls and women.'* The strategy was reconceived as the Teacher Relocation Policy, which is expected to be finalized by December 2018. However, social mobilisers and communities implemented several ad-hoc approaches and attempts to promote supportive environments in the target communities in the absence of formal guidance. In many cases, it appears that communities required little convincing to provide such support, with Social Mobilisers acting to identify interested individuals and communities, rather than engaging in consistently persuasive advocacy.

## Strategy 3.2. Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level

### Recruitment of Experienced Urban Teachers to Needy Rural Areas

Urban teachers, thought to be better educated and more qualified especially in school science subjects than rurally-sourced candidates, were recruited through a free competitive process to work in remote formal schools. Teachers were required to have the minimum standards mandated by the government, and were initially recruited by provincial education authorities; responsibility for recruitment transitioned to the MOE in 2014/2015 due to concerns surrounding transparency of the process. Initial programme documents envisioned these teachers would have a minimum amount of experience; however, teachers with any experience level were allowed to apply. In the selection process, stakeholders indicated experienced candidates would receive preference.

### Incentivising Urban Teachers to Stay and Teach in Rural Areas

Incentives were core to ensuring redeployed teachers would stay in their new homes. Some communities provided housing to the teachers, free of charge, as a means of supporting the programme. Prior to 2016, female teachers received $700 USD per month, and their *Mahram* $300 USD. After the 2016 qualification-based pay scale reforms at the MOE, this was revised with teachers eligible to receive $700 USD per month and a relocation allowance of $1,000 USD, payable only upon completion of at least 6 months of the contract.

### Strategy 3.3. Develop a system for recruitment, training and employment of female teachers at the local level

➤ **Teacher Training for Adolescent Girls**

Seeking to build a sustainable cadre of future teachers, bright adolescent girls were to be selected by formal secondary school teachers to receive INSET I training. This training was intended to spur interest, and ensure these girls had the required training to serve as CBE or ALP teachers on graduation should they choose to pursue a teaching career.

## Programme Priority 4: Streamline policy and administrative systems in the Ministry of Education

### Strategy 4.1. Enhance policy review and development

➤ **Academic Council and Boards of Standards (ACBS) Capacity Support to Develop Policy**

The ACBS is responsible for the commissioning of, as well as review and approval of, regulations, policies, qualifications, and standards in the education sector. The GPE programme aimed to strengthen ACBS's capacity through the development and implementation of a strategy for policy review, development, and dissemination, including clear division of tasks; processes, training programs; and monitoring. The GPE programme contracted a number of consultants (one international and four nationals) to undertake development of needed policies:
- Social Mobilisation Strategy;
- CBE Outreach Policy;
- Early Education Development Policy;
- Female Teacher Relocation Policy; and
- Communication Strategy.

### Strategy 4.2. Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring

➤ **Education Planning and Management Training for DEO and PED**

8 members of staff in the General Directorate of Planning and Evaluation at the MOE were selected to serve as Master Trainers. The GPE funding fed into ongoing initiatives to train relevant members of MOE staff, working with the Kabul-based UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), established between the initial application and the implementation phase, entitled to National Institute for Education Planning, as originally planned. The course of study led to a diploma and lasted 13 weeks; instruction covered how to:
- Conduct statistical analysis for education sector planning;
- Design and draft an education sector diagnosis;
- Use simulation/projection tools for plan target setting;
- Evaluate the relevance and feasibility of alternative strategies, aimed to attain the set objectives and strategies;
- Operationalise plan objectives into education sector programmes;
- Design organisational frameworks for plan monitoring and evaluation;
- Select, analyse, and present relevant information for planning;
- Organise collaborative work for education sector planning tasks; and

- Moderate dialogue and consultation with stakeholders in the plan preparation process.

On completion of the course, Master Trainers were then tasked with delivering cascaded training to staff in the PEDs and DEOs, working to strengthen national capacities in education planning, management, and administration.

➤ **Strengthening Education management Information System (EMIS)**

The EMIS Directorate was supported in the procurement of new systems for networked data collection and management at the central and provincial levels. Additional support was procured to provide the technical support in the networking of these systems, and training of MOE staff in their upkeep. Further to this, several members of full time staff at the EMIS Directorate had their salaries paid by the GPE Programme on the condition GPE work be prioritised above that required by the wider MOE.

**Strategy 4.3. Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE**

➤ **Creation of the GPE Programme Coordination Unit (GPEPCU) in the central MOE**

The GPEPCU was created and served as the core body responsible for driving Programme implementation through the MOE. The Unit worked to plan activities in collaboration with the relevant departments and directorates at the MOE, and then oversaw implementation, tracking milestones, outputs, and budgets, endeavouring to ensure implementation was undertaken on-schedule and to-standard. The Unit also served as the primary liaison between the government and the international partners, working to promote the smooth flow of information, timely reporting, and a strong working relationship. Where required, the Unit sought advice from UNICEF, or undertook to achieve wider ministerial buy-in through direct solicitation of support from the Minister and Deputy Minister. Some GPEPCU staff were embedded in other departments (e.g. Finance - both central and provincial, procurement, Human Resource and other relevant ministry departments).

# Programme Note: Shifts from Original Programme Document

As has been highlighted throughout the preceding summary, the Programme saw several shifts in implementation away from what was originally conceived.

The most substantial of these comprised the early shift away from decentralised models (led by NGOs and SMSs) toward a centralised model under the Kabul-based government. Consequently, many programmes which would have seen needs assessments, training, activity, and fund disbursals undertaken at the community level by NGO and community-based partners, were instead funnelled through central management, procurement, and financial systems, often with multiple levels of government (central, provincial, and district) involved.

The second major modification in the original programme design was the change in the concept and scope of the SIP. Whereas in the original programme proposal SIPs were meant to focus on improving both the quality of education and that of educational facilities, the average cost of SIPS increased and the programme focused exclusively on the second objective.

The third major amendment in programme design had to do with the SMSs and local communities, initially intended to undertake leadership of the work. However, the decision was taken early in the programme to shift contracting to the central government, minimising the involvement of local communities in this process. The ISD was tasked to oversee the whole process of identification, selection, tendering, construction, and maintenance of physical facilities in schools. This strategy affected the community ownership, management, and accountability of development activities, leading to delays in approval and implementation of SIPs.

Several other shifts were undertaken in 2014, primarily in budgetary allocations, to account for underestimates of cost and resource requirements. These largely focused on:

- Average SIP project budgets were raised to account for higher costs of implementation than anticipated;
- Upward revision of MBE teacher incentives, and unit costs of learning materials; and
- Adjustment to the quantity of Technical Assistance staff for the MOE (primarily in support of provincial financial systems), as well as associated costs to minimise duplication and promote improved effectiveness of delivery.

Changes in programme design and priorities are also reflected in major changes in the programme budget in 2014, as is evident from the table below.

*Table 1 - GPE Programme Priorities*

| Programme Priority | Original budget | | Revised budget, 2013 | | Change in budget | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $ million | % | $ million | % | $ million | % |
| 1. Strengthen community and social mobilization and governance systems at local level | 14.8 | 27% | 24.1 | 43% | 9.3 | 17% |
| 2. Expand and reinforce multiple pathways to education | 17.2 | 31% | 19.6 | 35% | 2.4 | 4% |
| 3. Increase number of Qualified Female Teachers in areas with high gender disparities | 16.4 | 29% | 6.2 | 11% | -10.2 | -18% |
| 4. Streamline policy and administrative systems in MoE | 7.3 | 13% | 5.8 | 10% | -1.5 | -3% |

| | | 55.7 | 100% | 55.7 | 100% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total** | | **55.7** | **100%** | **55.7** | **100%** |

## Note on Delay of Launch from 2011 to 2013

Launch of activities was delayed until 2013, offering the MOE time to recruit needed staff for implementation, as well as for the re-negotiation of programme plans, strategies, and implementation modalities (esp. on the shift from NGO- to central government-driven implementation). As such, 2013, instead of 2012, was considered 'Year 1' of the programme.

# 3  Planning, Implementation, and Oversight

This section endeavours to describe the systems and approaches underpinning planning, direct implementation, and oversight of the GPE Programme; the focus is primarily on those administrative, planning, and management/financial processes that may not have been described in the original programme document, but are nonetheless important to understand. This information will contextualise later discussions of results, lessons learned, and recommendations.

## No-cost Extensions (NCEs) and Grace Periods

| | |
|---|---|
| **NCE 2014** | This sought to provide an additional 6 months (July – Dec 2015), to account for shift from NGO and MOE-focused implementation, and to allow for changes in the budget. |
| **NCE 2015** | As the Programme approached the end of the initially-planned programme period, it was clear activities were well behind initial plans; the team requested a No-cost Extension, with minimal changes to the activities or programme budgets (this NCE sought to provide an additional 12 months Jan-Dec 2016). |
| **NCE 2016** | An additional NCE was requested in 2017 (providing an additional 6 months: Jan-Jun 2017), once again to account for delays in implementation (primarily SIPs and school reopening); this was also requested to allow children attending supported CBEs and ALPs to transition to other schools once the Programme's teacher salary supports concluded. No more SIPs were to have been contracted after June 2017. |
| **Grace Period 2018** | A Grace Period request was filed in late 2017, seeking to extend the period during which existing SIPs could be completed and paid. Ultimately due to delays in completion of committed activities and unutilized programme budget GPE Afghanistan was granted six more months extension of grace period from January to 15th July 2018. |

## Programme Inception, Design, and Preparation

Seeking to benefit from the Global Partnership for Education's[13] support, Afghanistan began working toward the satisfaction of the GPE's prerequisites for application. One of these was an update of the country's NESP, building on the results of the country's first comprehensive national Education Sector Analysis (2010) – this was the first such national study undertaking to collate and analyse evidence from across the country on educational needs and standards. This update was released as the EIP (2011-2013).

The EIP sought to describe the means by which the government would improve access, equity, and quality of education across the country; it provided detailed and costed approaches to achieving the desired ends described within the contemporary NESP. It was prepared by a consultant, supported by GPE funds channelled through UNICEF, who developed the document in close consultation with the government and important local and international partners.

On final approval by the MOE, the EIP was appraised by a working group of key local donor organisations (Local Education Group), with feedback given and implemented across multiple exchanges. Once approved, the document was formally submitted to the GPE Secretariat's Board of Directors, comprising representatives of the primary donor countries and organisations. The

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[13] The GPE was then known as the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (FTI).

application was finally approved in 2011, with $55.7m USD awarded for this GPE Programme. The Programme was implemented 100% 'on-budget', meaning it was delivered entirely through the government's own processes, systems, and procedures as part of their official budget. Funding was initially to be spent between 2012 and 2014.

Further to the requirements of the GPE, UNICEF was selected and appointed as the Supervising Entity; within this framework, they held responsibility for administration and disbursal of funds to the Afghan MOE, so long as disbursals were used in accordance with the commitments made to the GPE. The MOE was responsible for implementation of all programmes, and compliance with relevant GPE guidance and rules in the course of implementation. UNCEF provided further support in the form of technical advice to the MOE, as well as for contracting and oversight of: monitoring activities; financial advisory firms; and fiduciary oversight firms.

## Systems for Programme Implementation

Given the on-budget nature of the programme, the MOE's systems and processes were used in the execution and funding of project activities. The relevant activities and processes have been briefly described in this section:

### Procurement

**Central MOE**

#### Procurement of SIP works and materials

Once Social Mobilisers and the ISD had selected a target community and established feasibility for the selected works, the ISD would draft a detailed TOR and put it to tender through the central government's publication process.

Tenders were open for 90 days; if they did not receive a minimum of 3 compliant bids, the TOR viability would be re-assessed with the tender revised and relisted as appropriate. One key criteria for compliance was receipt of a financial bid that was both within the GPE Programme's limits, as well as within the estimate range created internal to the ISD. Once three compliant bids were received, the process for evaluation is meant to take 90 days; capacity challenges in the department responsible for tender evaluation often meant this limit was exceeded.

On pre-award, the ISD would undertake a final validation process; an ISD representative would meet the proposed staff, confirm the existence of key technical staff (e.g. qualified engineers), and the possession of RFP-specified equipment and tools. If the validation exercise was not successful, the SIP works would be re-tendered, beginning the process again.

#### Procurement of TLMs for supported CBE, ALP, MBE programmes

The procurement process for these materials was broadly similar to that of SIP works, with a few key distinctions: materials and goods were subject to standard specifications; delivery had to be undertaken within an agreed timeline; and delivery was subject to validation by the PED and local procurement department, as well as the Social Mobilisers.

### Programme policy and strategy consultants

The four consultants (a mix of national and international) corresponded broadly with the previous activities, however consultancies required drafting of a TOR though consultations between HR, UNICEF, the relevant MOE department, and the GPEPCU[14], with a request for proposals listed both on the government's procurement listings, as well as on relevant jobs websites. On receipt of applications, a committee comprising members of HR, UNICEF, the GPEPCU, Procurement, and the relevant department scored applications; technical scores generally comprised 70% of all marks, while financial scores comprised 30%.

## Provincial and District

### Procurement for school reopening activities

School reopening activities and materials were the only procurement undertaken at the provincial level. TORs were generally drafted in consultation with the provincial planning department and Social Mobilisers, following community consultations. These were then publicised at the PEDs – this was generally characterised as noticeboards at the PED – with evaluation of tenders undertaken by the relevant member of PED staff. PEDs were nominally bound by the same regulations as the central government.

# Finance

## Central MOE

### SIP Payments

SIP payments were subject to validated delivery of the relevant works or goods. In the case of works, this required the approval – often necessitating a site visit – of 47 individuals at the district, provincial, and central government level. The rationale for 47 signatures does not appear to be based in relevant law or statute, but rather seems to be a working policy of the relevant departments of the MoE and the Ministry of Finance.

Validation of goods and materials delivery, though not quite as onerous, still required multiple rounds of validation and several signatures at the district, provincial, and central level.

Both of these processes, due to their complexity and the need for validation in insecure areas, could often take months if not years to complete.

### All teacher salaries post-2016

After 2016, the teacher salary payment system was revised, with disbursals made directly from the central government to a bank account nominated

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[14] The GPEPCU was an office established within the MOE to facilitate coordination between government and international partners, as well as drive implementation through central government processes. The Unit is described in more detail in the section on Programme Priority 4 (starting page 21).

by the instructor. This often meant that teachers did not have to travel as far or as often to collect their salaries. It also shortened transfer times, while minimising many of the concerns raised regarding compliance and transparency when teachers had to collect funds in cash from PEDs. While direct payment, relative to the previous model, shortened payment times, substantial delays can still emerge.

**Disbursal of programme funds, except those disbursed by provincial and district authorities.**

All other payments were channelled through the regular MOE mechanisms for financing of salaries, travel, materials, and other operating costs. This could, at times, require the transfer of funds from Kabul to the province, and then again to the district; each level had its own processes, procedures to complete, and signatures to secure, which could often result in long lead times until funds arrived at their intended destination.

## Provincial and District

**Teacher salaries pre-2016**

Prior to 2016, teachers were required to travel to the PED to collect their salaries in cash. Collection had to be undertaken within 20 days of PED's receipt, or else funds would be returned to the central government. In the targeted remote regions communication was a substantial challenge, as was the requirement to travel to the PEDs (at times up to eight hours' journey). Additional compliance and transparency challenges were frequently highlighted with this model of payment.

# Human Resources

## Central MOE

**Hiring of Social Mobilisers**

The specified selection process for this role comprised first drafting a TOR for both roles though consultations between HR, the Academic Supervision Department, and the GPEPCU, with a job advertisement released on several Afghan websites; some additional promotion of the roles happened at the PED level, though such province-level activities may not have been standardised or systematic. The person requirements for the Provincial Social Mobilisation Coordinators and the District Social Mobilisers comprised:

| **Provincial Social Mobilisation Co-ordinator** | **District Social Mobilisers** |
| --- | --- |
| • Relevant Bachelor's or Higher<br>• 3 years' work experience relevant to solidarity and social mobilisation;<br>• Age 25-45 years. | • Relevant Bachelor's or Higher<br>• 2 years' work experience relevant to solidarity and social mobilisation;<br>• Age 25-45 years. |

In addition to basic qualifications, the candidates were also required to have a variety of characteristics like strong organisation skills, effective communication skills, and a broad understanding of the education sector.

A committee comprising members of HR, the Academic Supervision Department, and the GPEPCU was responsible for shortlisting of candidates. Shortlisted candidates were then given a written exam, and on passing the exam, an interview. All recruitment was undertaken centrally, meaning that candidates had to travel to Kabul (at their own expense) for examinations and interview, at times needing to make multiple trips to attend examinations and interviews.

### Hiring of formal school teachers

After 2014/2015, recruitment of these teachers was undertaken through central MOE HR systems, with the support of the Female Teacher Department, and the GPEPCU. These teachers generally had the following qualifications:

- Until 2016, they needed to have only a grade 12 certificate; and
- After 2016, recruits must have graduated from grade 14 and an accredited teacher training programme.

The approach was similar to that described in the recruitment of Social Mobilisers: collaborative drafting of the TOR; advertisement online and in PEDs; committee shortlisting; written exam in Kabul; interview in Kabul; and selection. Teachers would then begin the process of redeployment.

## Provincial and District

### Hiring of CBE and ALP teachers

After nomination by their local community, recruits would be given a standard CBE/ALP instructor exam at the PED to ensure they meet minimum standards. If the exam was passed, the candidates would then be eligible to receive relevant training and become CBE/ALP instructors under the Programme.

### Hiring of formal school teachers

Prior to 2014/2015, recruitment of these teachers was undertaken through PED HR systems. These teachers generally had the following qualifications:

- Until 2016, they needed to have only a grade 12 certificate; and
- After 2016, recruits must have graduated from grade 14 and an accredited teacher training programme.

The specified approach was broadly similar in most respects to the Kabul-based process (regarding examination, interview, etc.), but with advertisement undertaken at the local PEDs; the specific approaches taken to advertisement were unclear.

Female formal school teacher recruitment was transitioned to the central MOE when concerns relating to transparency of the recruitment process, as well as ghost teachers, were identified in 2014/2015.

# External Oversight and Monitoring

A number of independent oversight and accountability activities were procured and overseen by UNICEF; these were core in attempts to ensure transparent implementation of the GPE Programme.

**Programme Monitoring and Evaluation**

Within its role as SE, UNICEF received funding from USAID to commission third-party monitoring of the Programme. The original programme period was monitored by KPMG (GPE Programme Fiduciary Advisor that superceded by GTA in 2016), and all post 2016 monitoring was undertaken by GTA. Monitoring comprised annual visits across all provinces in a random selection of districts, and undertook to validate every category of activity (with the exception of adolescent girls' teacher training) through surveys, FGDs, and GIS-logged photos of classes, materials, and works. Monitoring activities specifically examined the following:

- Type of class or SIP intervention, start and end dates, links/distance from the hub school;
- Physical facilities including availability of furniture, equipment, stationery, books and teaching kits, etc.;
- Enrolment and attendance by gender;
- Timing, duration and regularity of classes, adequacy of timings and learning activities;
- Teacher qualification and trainings, salary, delay in salary, and use of physical punishment, etc.;
- Status and existing usage of SIP facility;
- School supervision and management including existence of SMS;
- Transition of students to hub schools; and
- Reopening of closed schools.

GTA's responsibilities also included the drafting of a final Monitoring and Evaluation Report, summarising the project's progress against the programmes output and impact targets.

**Programme Financial, Programmatic, and Compliance Audits**

As part of the original Programme, multiple stakeholders were required to undertake audits of Programme funds and activity:

| | |
|---|---|
| MOE Internal Auditor | Annual (within 60 days of close) |
| Supreme Auditing Institution of Afghanistan | Annual (within 180 days of close) |

However, the Supreme Auditing Institution of Afghanistan faced challenges in meeting this obligation; non-completion of the audit led to delays in fund disbursals (causing some challenges in programme implementation) until UNICEF contracted independent audit firms (EY and PKF) to undertake the audit starting from 2015. Funding for this supplementary activity was provided by USAID.

The audits did not only focus on finance, but undertook to validate programmatic reporting and cross-check reports against financial documentation. Such was the standard of this activity that $121,000 USD of misused funds (at the provincial level) were identified, allowing UNICEF to secure refund/reimbursement and support the MOE in improving capacities to minimise such concerns in the future.

**Fiduciary Oversight (Financial Advisor)**

Further to the Grant Agreement signed between UNICEF, the GPE, and the Afghan MOE, UNICEF contracted a Financial Advisor with responsibility for supporting the MOE in ensuring financial compliance and control, and overall responsibility for promoting transparent use of GPE funds. The financial advisor was embedded in UNICEF, though spent substantial time at the Afghan MOE working closely with finance staff.

## GPE Grant Agreement Responsibilities

Both UNICEF and the MOE made several commitments in the initial Grant Agreement, seeking to ensure effective, impactful and transparent use of the GPE grant. A synthesis of relevant terms, and the degree to which each party complied with these, has been provided below.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| UNICEF & MOF | Creation of a dedicated bank account for the GPE Programme | **Met** |
| Both UNICEF and the Afghan MOF created Programme-specific bank accounts. | | |
| UNICEF | Contracting an embedded financial advisor for MOE and MOF | **Met** |
| UNICEF contracted KPMG and GTA to this end. | | |
| MOE | Submission of annual budgets and cost projections | **Met** |
| The MOE regularly met this requirement, with substantial support from the Programme Financial Advisor. | | |
| UNICEF and MOE | Mutual notification of fund receipt | **Met** |
| UNICEF met this obligation throughout the Programme period. | | |
| UNICEF | Validating process of disbursement from financial advisor, submitted on behalf of MOE | **Met** |
| Financial advisory firms met these requirements. | | |
| UNICEF | The fund custodian may suspend disbursement of funds based on material observation identified in internal and external audit | **Met** |
| UNICEF did, for a period, suspend fund disbursals when audit obligations were not met, indicating this requirement was broadly implemented. | | |
| MOF & Financial Advisor | Notification of UNICEF in the event of identifying irregularities in fund use | **Met** |
| There were two incidents of misappropriation of funds in Ghor and Daikundi provinces which were immediately reported to fund custodian; however, these reports built heavily on the extra-contractual audit commissioned by UNICEF on behalf of the MOE. | | |
| MOF | Timely funds transfer to provinces for relevant activities | **Not Met** |
| Fund transfers were made, but their timeliness was at times a challenge; substantial delays were frequently reported; delays of over one year were reported. | | |
| MOE | Inter-Ministerial coordination | **Met** |
| The MOE undertook this activity, though some challenges (previously highlighted) were experienced in the course of programme implementation. | | |

| MOE | Submission of an annual work plan | Met |
|---|---|---|

This was regularly undertaken by the MOE, through the GPEPCU, with substantial support from UNICEF.

| MOE | Creation of a public access website providing information of the GPE programme | Met |
|---|---|---|

This was partially completed by the MOE, though does not appear to have been completely or regularly updated.

| MOE | Internal audit of programme funds | Met |
|---|---|---|

This was undertaken as required, with regular submission of audit documents; submissions were, however, regularly submitted after substantial delays.

| Supreme Auditor of Afghanistan | External audit of programme funds | Not Met |
|---|---|---|

The government could not meet this obligation, leading to substantial delays in fund disbursals. UNICEF contracted EY and then PKF to undertake this audit.

| MOE | Following all relevant government guidelines and regulations for implementation | Met |
|---|---|---|

This was broadly met, though some instances of misappropriation of funds was identified. It appears remedial action was immediately taken in this case.

| PEDs | Technical and financial report submitted on quarterly basis | Partially Met |
|---|---|---|

These reports are submitted on a bi-annual basis rather than quarterly basis along with substantial delay in submission.

| MOE | Implementation and update of the M&E framework, ensuring activities effective tracked against it | Met |
|---|---|---|

Initial M&E framework along with key performance indicators and targets were finalised and endorsed by relevant directorates of MOE in May 2015.

# 4  Analysis of Programme Results

This section explores how well the programme performed relative to initial plans and targets, with analyses of factors underpinning relative success or shortfall across the priorities, strategies, and activities.

## Programme Priority 1: Strengthen Community and Social Mobilisation and Governance Systems at the Local Level

## Strategy 1.1: Enhance community and social mobilisation

➤ **Development and Strengthening of Social Mobilisation (SM) Capacity, SM Recruitment, Training, and Deployment**

*Figure 1: Provincial Social Mobiliser Staffing Levels*    *Figure 2: District Social Mobiliser Staffing Levels*



The recruitment process for Social Mobilisers began in 2012 through central MOE recruitment processes and was not completed until 2013. Several challenges cited in this regard comprised: challenges in finalising approval for shifts in implementation (NGO- to central-government oriented); the lengthy centralised hiring process; and challenges in finding qualified candidates for many roles, particularly those in the provinces.

Challenges in staffing were experienced through both provincial and centralised processes. Initial recruitment for many roles (including District and Provincial coordination and mobilisation staff) was left to PEDs; however, challenges were identified in limited transparency of the process leading to issues with provincial and district staff capacity and engagement.

The first 1-2 years of the programme were said to have been impacted as a result, leading to a shift in recruitment to central MOE processes in Kabul. This Kabul-based process was not said to be without its own challenges in transparency and timeliness, but was characterised as being less subject to local political challenges and more likely to result in qualified staff being hired.

Recruitment levels were relatively close to targets throughout the programme, though with some expected turnover. Gaps between 2015 and 2016 are thought to result from a MOE hiring freeze, making replacement of staff who had left the programme a challenge. 2017 and 2018 saw a downward shift of District Social Mobiliser quantity, given re-adjustment of budgets following the 2016 NCE.

Once hired, the Social Mobilisation Department of the MOE delivered training to all candidates in Kabul, building on existing tools and resources drawn from other relevant projects. In some

cases, candidates were required to travel to Kabul at their own expense for training, needing to wait substantial periods for reimbursement (some reports indicate delays of up to one year were experienced), once again posing potential barriers to some recruits.

With regards to training of replacement SM staff, it is unclear whether this was undertaken at all; limited budget was allocated for this at the outset of the Programme, and may well have been compounded by the unanticipated duration of Programme activities.

*Figure 3: Mobilisation Activities – Regular awareness raising meetings in districts*



These comprised the formal activities undertaken by Social Mobilisers, supported by GPE programme Engineers as appropriate, holding meetings with communities to raise awareness about the GPE Programme, and undertake to establish interest in support. Some additional work was taken to minimise concerns in communities regarding the Programme, and to promote greater inclusion of girls in education programming.

Several challenges underpinned shortfalls in achievement of annual targets:

**Recruitment and Onboarding**

As previously discussed, the recruitment and onboarding process for SMs faced some challenges, leading to later delays in these activities.

**Insecurity**

SMs reported inability to access some locations, particularly as the security situation began to deteriorate in 2014-2015. This posed substantial barriers to the achievement of these outputs.

**Remote Locations**

Many target areas were very remote, with District Social Mobilisers usually resident in major population areas; distances were challenging to cover, or in areas accessible only by foot or even donkey, with such concerns exacerbated by delays in disbursal of travel funds (see below).

**Delayed Disbursal of Salaries and Travel Funds**

Salaries and travel fund disbursals were often late (sometimes more than a year), posing challenges to Social Mobilisers' capacity to fund travel and social mobilisation activity.

**Coordination Challenges**

Various reports, and accounts by relevant stakeholders, documented coordination challenges between stakeholders at the central, provincial, and district level; much of this coordination was essential to the effective planning and implementation of activities.

> **Regular Meetings with Key Stakeholders at Coordination Level**

At programme outset, such coordination meetings were intended to happen once every two months in each province, drawing all key GPE staff and other relevant stakeholders to a central Provincial location; overall target achievement until 2016 fell short by about 50% until meeting frequency was reduced to quarterly in 2016 and 2017. In 2016 and 2017, meeting frequency broadly achieved targeted.

Previously-cited challenges relating to distances and delays in reimbursement of travel funds for attendance underpinned some shortfalls, as did poor coordination among key stakeholders at each level (district, provincial, and central).

> **Development of National MOE Communications Strategy**

| Planned completion date: | 2013 |
|---|---|
| Actual completion date: | 30 May 2018 |

In 2013 and 2014, consultancy support was secured to this end through central MOE procurement, with consultants placed on one-year fixed-disbursal (not deliverable-based) contracts. No deliverables appear to have emerged from this first engagement.

In late 2017, another national consultant was hired to undertake the development of this strategy, with the preliminary steps put in place. 15; However, the rapid turnover of ministers (whose office is responsible for the approval of such strategies) with different priorities has resulted that the strategy cannot be developed and finalized as it was slated to close by May 2018. The ongoing turnover of key ministerial leadership has posed barriers to complete this task. Still it is in a draft version and MoE Planning department took charge to complete and finalize the strategy by 2018.

📝 **Strategy 1.1 Summary Output Table**

*Table 2 - Progress Table, Strategy 1.1: Enhance community and social mobilization*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | Develop training material and guidelines for social mobilizers, including linkages with two other Programme Priorities (multiple pathways and female teachers) | Targets | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 1.1.2 | Salary and communication & transportation allowances for 120 social mobilizers | Targets | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 77 | - |
| | | Actual | 111 | 96 | 91 | 109 | 75 | - |

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[15] This was submitted to the UNICEF team, and appears to be of an appropriate standard, and fit for purpose.

| 1.1.3 | Training of social mobilizers (re-view workshop /refresher train-ing) | Tar-gets | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Actual | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 1.1.4 | Salary and Communication & transportation cost for 13 Provin-cial Social Mobilization Coordi-nators | Tar-gets | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | - |
| | | Actual | 13 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 12 | - |
| 1.1.5 | Conduct bi-monthly meetings among social mobilizers, DEO and PED (6 meetings/year for 13 province) / Quarterly Review Workshops at Central level | Tar-gets | 78 | 78 | 78 | 3 | 2 | - |
| | | Actual | 33 | 43 | 43 | 1 | 2 | - |
| 1.1.6 | Develop advocacy material and engagement guidelines | Tar-gets | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1.1.7 | Organize regular events at dis-trict and provincial level on awareness for education (8 events/year/province) / Field Monitoring Visits at provincial level | Tar-gets | 149 | 106 | 104 | 1,080 | 120 | - |
| | | Actual | 47 | 63 | 50 | 103 | 80 | - |
| 1.1.8 | Develop communication strategy based on the needs and subse-quently review | Tar-gets | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | 1[16] | - |
| 1.1.9 | Communication strategy imple-mented as per plan | Tar-gets | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |

# Strategy 1.2. Strengthen school governance for quality schools

➤ **Training of School Management Shuras (SMS) in Effective Administration**

*Figure 4: School Management Shuras Trained*



Social Mobilisers, supported by GPE Engineers, provided training to School Management Shuras; initially intended to focus on administration of development, contracting, implementation, and oversight, training as delivered focused primar-ily on maintenance of delivered works and brief-ings about the SIP process and timelines.

Challenges in needs assessment, access, pro-curement, finance, and other areas highlighted

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[16] Draft completed and awaiting further review from Academic Council and relevant stakeholders.

elsewhere posed challenges to implementation; these combined challenges resulted in delays well past the initially-targeted end year of 2015.

Data on the number of SMSs trained differs from that provided by Provincial Coordinators during the field visits, and that provided by GPEPCU. As GPEPCU did not have any data on the number of SMS members, it was assumed that the number of SMS members trained was equal to the number of SMS members present. As such, women appear to be marginalized in school management, with only 8.9% female SMS members.

*Table 3 - Comparison of data provided by GPECU and Provincial Coordinators (PCs) of male and female SMS members*

|  | As per PCs | | | As Per GPECU | | | Difference | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | **Male** | **Female** | **Total** | **Male** | **Female** | **Total** | **Male** | **Female** | **Total** |
| **Total** | **5,386** | **576** | **5,962** | **6,657** | **647** | **7,304** | **(1,271)** | **(71)** | **(1,342)** |
|  | **90.3%** | **9.7%** |  | **91.1%** | **8.9%** |  |  |  |  |

➤ **School Improvement Plans (SIPs) and Implementation**

*Figure 5: SIPs Approved for Implementation*



SIPs were subject to some delay given the protracted process described in the programme and systemic overview. The requirement for needs assessment, followed by feasibility approval by relevant central MOE departments (at times impeded by security challenges) posed challenges to effective implementation, with much implementation not beginning until well after the end of the original Programme period (2015). Some stakeholders indicated strong financial controls placed on Programme activities, compounded by limited support from key ministerial leaders, may have resulted in limited prioritisation of SIP implementation on the part of several government departments.

*Table 4: SIP Status by Year*

|  | In progress | Completed | Cancelled |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | - | 76 | 23 |
| 2015 | - | 191 | 12 |
| 2016 | - | 231 | 12 |
| 2017 | - | 259 | 9 |
| 2018 | - | 359 | 281 |
| **Total** | **-** | **1,116** | **337** |

According to GTA, a total of 1,453 SIPs costing $18.29 USD million were issued by the ISD between 2014 and 2017. Only construction SIPs were issued from 2014 to 2016, with goods SIPs being added in 2017 to meet lagging programme targets; after 2017 only, good SIPs were issued. About 66% SIPs involved construction (drinking water wells, toilets, boundary walls), while c. 34% of SIPs comprised 'goods' contracts (Desk and Chairs for school students, solar energy). The number of SIPs ranged from 208 in Ghor, which also had the maximum number of construction SIPs, to only 36 in Zabul. Uruzgan had the maximum number of goods SIPs, while Zabul had the smallest number. A total of 337 SIPs Including 65 related to construction and 272 related to goods (203 SIPs of Mumtaz Ahmadi CC and 69 SIPs of Gam-e-Noor), were cancelled.

Table 5: SIPs by type, completion rates, and province

|  | Construction SIPs | Goods SIPs | SIPs Completed | SIPs in Progress | SIPs Canceled | Total SIPs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total** | 955 | 498 | 1116 |  | 337 | **1453** |
| **%** | 66% | 34% | 77% | 0% | 23% |  |

Table 6: SIP Delays by Year

| Year | 01-06 Months | | 07-12 Months | | 13-24 Months | | 25-36 Months | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Qty. | USD | Qty. | USD | Qty. | USD | Qty. | USD |
| 2014 | 91 | 93,950,011 | 81 | 86,806,062 | 130 | 125,117,691 | 55 | 56,103,712 |
| 2015 | 24 | 10,887,679 | 18 | 14,723,485 | 17 | 3,865,184 | - | - |
| 2016 | 58 | 18,371,537 | 0 | 0 | 122 | 96,209,591 |  |  |
| 2017 | 45 | 14,253,779 | 0 | 0 | 242 | 220,030,358 | - | - |
| 2018 |  |  | 282 | 237,603,620 | - | - | - | - |
| **Total** | **218** | **137,463,006** | **381** | **339,133,167** | **511** | **445,222,824** | **55** | **56,103,712** |

On a year-to-year basis, most SIPs were delayed 13-24 months in implementation and completion; delay statistics above do not include delays emerging from the initial procurement process, which could require up to 1-2 years (for some SIPs) to pass through the initial tender and approval processes. In 2017 and 2018, the pace of works increased substantially with the intent of using the available budget before project close.

Several additional areas of challenge relate to the centralised procurement mechanism: at times, local contractors would not win works, which would instead be awarded to contractors from other parts of the country with limited local knowledge or support. This could cause security challenges, not directly related to the Anti-Government Elements, or community resistance to implementation. Contractor incapacity to deliver could at times cause the need for re-tendering projects, with an awarded party not having the promised staff capacity (e.g. sufficiently skilled/qualified engineers), or not having appropriate equipment to complete the contract. In other cases, bids received were outside approved budgets or estimates, requiring re-tendering. Consequently, works would need to be re-tendered, beginning the lengthy process again. Some MOE stakeholders estimate that 10%-15% of SIPs either needed to be re-tendered, or were outright cancelled, due to the challenges described in this section.

*Table 7 - Progress Table, Strategy 1.2: Strengthen school governance for quality schools*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1.2.1** | Train SMS on participatory SIP development | Targets | - | 600 | 400 | 414 | 200 | - |
| | | Actual | - | 152 | 356 | 131 | 200 | - |
| **1.2.2** | Provide school grants for SIP implementation | Targets[17] | 200 | 600 | 400 | 599 | 438 | 640 |
| | | Actual | - | 131 | 117 | 329 | 203 | 359 |
| **1.2.3** | Provision of hiring Engineers to implement SIPs as identified - Engineers Salaries | Targets | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | - |
| | | Actual | 16 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 15 | - |

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[17] The total number of SIPs to be Implemented remained 1,000; however, the given delays In SIP Implementation, the target for the subsequent years kept on Increasing. Therefore, the target numbers do not add up.

# Programme Priority 2: Expand and Reinforce Multiple Pathways to Education

## Strategy 2.1: Expand Access to Community-based Education (CBE) and Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP)

> **CBE and ALP Opportunity and Needs Mapping, Social Mobilisation**

*Figure 6: Needs mapping exercises undertaken*



This activity appeared to be broadly undertaken in keeping with targets, though the desire to undertake targeted and considered needs assessments resulted in scaling of activity that may have been somewhat slower than planned. Completion of these targets was reported to result from the minimal need for cross-departmental coordination and minimal requirements for engagement with onerous procurement and finance processed at the central and provincial levels.

Needs assessments resulted in community nomination of CBE and ALP instructors, who would then be placed on Provincial CBE and ALP teacher rolls and paid by Programme funds. These teachers would often be contracted, and begin teaching, within a relatively short period; many may not have received salaries for over a year, and training for up to three. Mapping exercises were no longer undertaken after 2015, as the Programme had identified as many CBE and ALP candidate communities as it could support.

> **Teacher Training for CBE and ALPs**

|  | CBEs | | | ALPs | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | M | F | Tot. | M | F | Tot. |
| **Target:** |  |  | 2,100 |  |  | 800 |
| **Achievement (2016):** | 1,332 | 256 | 1,588 | 374 | 159 | 533 |

Training was intended to begin in 2013, and completed by 2015; however, several challenges resulted in delays in programming.

Administration challenges at the provincial then up to the central level appear to have slowed the registration of teachers, making it challenging for quick start of activities.

Initial programme budgets underestimated costs associated with training these teachers, requiring substantial re-planning and renegotiation of training content were also seen to delay implementation. This process was not completed until 2016, with achievement targets re-adjusted from initial programme targets to account for limited budgets.

**CBE & ALP Access Expanded through Provision of Teaching and Learning Materials, School Kits, Salaries**

*Figure 7: CBE Teacher Salaries*

*Figure 8: ALP Teacher Salaries*



Within ALP, annual teacher levels achieved (or nearly achieved) targets relatively quickly; however, some drop-off in the following years was experienced. CBE teacher recruitment grew relatively consistently, nearly achieving the desired target by the end of the original programme period[18].

The targets were initially meant to be annual (meaning 2100 CBE teachers and 800 ALP teachers were to be recruited within the first year, and paid until the end of the Programme); however, initial programme design provided limited time for considered needs assessment and targeting in relevant programmes. Stakeholders involved in early implementation indicated this resulted in a rushed implementation, and establishment of CBEs and ALPs in communities where they were not necessarily required; much enrolment in CBEs and ALPs is not centrally tracked, with NGOs supporting classes with limited central coordination, limiting knowledge of what is being delivered where and by whom. ALP drop-offs and CBE's gradual increases were said to emerge from a desire on the part of the Programme team to undertake more considered needs assessments, and ensure effective allocation of support to communities, rather than rush to meet targets and spend funds.

The GPE Programme's field third-party monitoring firm undertook to validate the existence of teachers paid through these interventions, finding limited cases of ghost teachers. Validation of such findings is always a substantial challenge in Afghanistan, but these may offer some positive indications as to the actual quantity of teachers recruited as part of the initiative.

*Figure 9: CBEs – Supported Children + School Kits*

*Figure 10: ALP – Supported Children + School Kits*

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[18] Please note that in both activities, the 2016 NCE undertook to provide some support exceeding initial programme targets in this area (labelled 'NCE Additions' in the above charts).

The above totals comprise the total quantity of 'school kits' provided to supported schools, which was assumed by the programme team to align with actual enrolment in each supported CBE or ALP. The field third-party monitoring firm undertook to validate this, finding that variation in actual enrolment of 10%-15% in either direction. Validation of such findings is always a substantial challenge in Afghanistan, but these may offer some positive indications as to the actual quantity of children enrolled through the GPE Programme.

Provision of school kits, though not necessarily enrolment, was delayed by challenges encountered in the various systems and processes involved in procurement and financial disbursals described in other sections. Namely, the need to pass through the following steps to achieve the desired ends:

1. Register classes at the provincial level;
2. Registrations to be passed to the central MOE accompanied by school kit content and costing specifications;
3. Central MOE approval of these requests;
4. Disbursal of funds from central coffers to the provincial level;
5. Tendering and procurement of materials at the provincial level;
6. Delivery of materials to PED; and
7. Delivery of materials to classes.

The complex and time-consuming processes and approvals required at each stage resulted in delays well past the originally-planned Programme period.

Please note that in both activities, the 2016 NCE undertook to provide some support exceeding initial programme targets in this area (labelled 'NCE Additions' in the above charts').

It does appear that programme targets will have been met or exceeded by the end of the Programme.

## Strategy 2.1 Summary Output Table

*Table 8 - Progress Table, Strategy 2.1: Expand Access to Community-based Education (CBE) and Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP)*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1.1 | Use school mapping tools to identify under-served areas where CBE classes are required | Targets | 1,200 | 1,200 | 622 | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | 894 | 584 | 622 | - | - | - |

41

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1.2 | Facilitate enrolment of students who are enrolled in schools / School kits for CBE students (purchased on provincial level) | Targets | 9,000 | 27,000 | 27,000 | 63,000 | 42,000 | - |
| | | Actual | 24,414 | 12,883 | 11,860 | 58,503 | 29,279 | - |
| 2.1.3 | Recruit qualified teachers from the villages - Salaries of CBE Teachers | Targets | 300 | 900 | 900 | 351 | 1,290 | - |
| | | Actual | 870 | 487 | 457 | 289 | 1,290 | - |
| 2.1.4 | Train qualified teachers from the villages - CBEs | Targets | - | 900 | 900 | 2,100 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | 1,588 | - | - |
| 2.1.5 | Use school mapping tools to identify under-served areas where ALP are required | Targets | 1,200 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | 668 | 590 | - | - | - | - |
| 2.1.6 | Facilitate enrolment of over-age students who are enrolled in schools - School kits for ALP students (purchased on provincial level) | Targets | 10,000 | 10,000 | 2,035 | 20,000 | 11,250 | - |
| | | Actual | 9,904 | 7,500 | 2,035 | 19,461 | 8,550 | - |
| 2.1.7 | Recruit qualified teachers from the village- Salaries of ALP Teachers | Targets | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 440 | - |
| | | Actual | 382 | 280 | 360 | 342 | 440 | - |
| 2.1.8 | Train qualified teachers from the village - ALPs | Targets | - | 400 | - | 800 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | 533 | - | - |

## Strategy 2.2: Strengthen Mosque-based Education (MBE)

➤ **Needs Assessment, Social Mobilisation with Mullahs and Communities**

Needs assessments for MBE were undertaken through the same process as the CBE and ALP needs mapping exercise. If a community nominated a mosque and Mullah to deliver education, instead of another provider in the community, MBE-focused resources would then be allocated to the community.

➤ **Pedagogy, Protection Training for Mullahs[19]**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Target:** | 6,000 |
| **Achievement:** | 2,045 |
| **Year:** | 2016 |

Challenges previously identified with regard to under-costings of teacher training, followed by a complex re-planning and renegotiation process, resulted in delays of up to three years in training delivery. Some Mullahs were receiving supports for nearly three years before receiving relevant training, with only c. 1/3 of the originally-planned quantity of Mullahs trained.

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[19] It must be noted that the achievement totals likely 'double-count' counting one teacher paid a salary for 5 years as 5 salaries paid toward the cumulative target.

> **Provision of Incentives, Teaching and Learning Materials to MBE Centres**

*Figure 11: Mullahs Supported with Incentives*      *Figure 12: Children Enrolled + TLMs Provided*



*Figure 11: Mullahs Supported with Incentives*



*Figure 12: Children Enrolled + TLMs Provided*

Challenges in the provision of Mullah salaries were similar to those facing payment of CBE and ALP instructors: delays in paying teacher salaries, delays in registration filtering up from provincial to central level, instructor turnover that Social Mobilisers were unable to fill due to other programme priorities, or limited follow-up. Early Programmes staff indicated initial security and vetting requirements for mullahs were another barrier to implementation in some regions: the need for mullahs to travel for vetting by provincial police and Ministry of Interior representatives was cause for concern for some candidates, who considered such interactions may lead to their being branded as 'collaborators' by anti-government forces. Early incentive budgets of $20 USD per month may have been considered insufficient to take such risks, or not high enough to generate interest in participation. Rapid acceleration of implementation can be seen following the implementation of changes to vetting and incentive design.

It appears Mullah salary payments were discontinued after 2016, with excess funds allocated to other programme components; some stakeholders cited a perceived greater impact of other supported education modalities, given that much Mosque-based education is very basic and focused primarily on pre-primary literacy and numeracy.

Nonetheless, achieved enrolment totals appear to have reached cumulative targets (though 1-2 years behind original plans), while supported Mullahs fell c. 17% below initial targets. As with CBEs and ALPs, enrolment was assumed to align with TLM distribution. The field third-party monitoring firm undertook to validate this, finding that variation in actual enrolment of c. 10%-15% in either direction. Once again, validation of such findings is always a substantial challenge in Afghanistan, but these may offer some positive indications as to the actual quantity of children enrolled through the GPE Programme's MBE programmes.

> **Strategy 2.2 Summary Output Table**

*Table 9 - Progress Table, Strategy 2.2: Strengthen Mosque-based Education (MBE)*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2.3.1** | Develop strategy for MBE | Targets | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **2.3.2** | | Targets | - | - | - | 4,403 | - | - |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Train Mullahs in pedagogy and teaching basic reading and numeracy skills / MBE Trainings | Actual | - | - | - | 2,045 | - | - |
| **2.3.2.1** Recruit Mullahs to teach in the Mosque-Salaries of Mullahs Imams | Targets | 500 | 2,500 | 3,000 | 2,418 | 79 | - |
| | Actual | 891 | 647 | 1,985 | 1,450 | - | - |
| **2.3.3** Number of MBE students enrolled and Provide textbooks and learning material to students. | Targets | 10,000 | 50,000 | 60,000 | 48,360 | - | - |
| | Actual | 22,311 | 14,923 | 47,750 | 42,820 | - | - |

## Strategy 2.3: Reopen schools

| | *Reopened Schools* | | *Enrolment* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Province | Target | Achiev. | Boys | Girls | Total |
| Helmand | 6 | 6 | 1,705 | 50 | 1,755 |
| Kandahar | 20 | 13 | 1,615 | 374 | 1,989 |
| Urozgan | 5 | - | - | - | - |
| Farah | 5 | 5 | 178 | 593 | 771 |
| Zabul | 10 | 5 | 538 | 72 | 610 |
| Ghor | 2 | 2 | 378 | 214 | 592 |
| Paktika | 1 | 1 | 120 | - | 120 |
| Paktia | 5 | - | - | - | - |
| Badghis | 22 | 16 | 1,824 | 134 | 1,958 |
| Nimroz | 24 | 4 | 676 | - | 676 |
| Nuristan | | - | - | - | - |
| **Total** | **100** | **52** | **7,034** | **1,437** | **8,471** |

Following the community level meetings and focus group discussions, the emergency funds (~$4,500 USD per school) were provided leading to reopening of 52 schools. Allocated funds were used for repair of damages in the buildings, purchase carpets, tents, blackboards, stationary and other necessary teaching and learning materials among others. 52 reopened schools (45 primary, 5 lower secondary and 2 upper secondary) have 259 active classes with 8,471 children enrolled (1,437 girls and 7,034 boys). School principals, teachers and other support staff working in reopened schools have been covered by official *Tashkeel* positions.

Within this area of activity, implementation consistently lagged behind targets, with school reopening beginning only at the end of 2017. Several challenges are thought to underpin this:

**Strategy and Mechanism for Implementation**

Initial programme plans anticipated the creation of a strategy and mechanism to facilitate easy identification of target areas, followed by rapid disbursal of funds. The strategy and mechanism were developed relatively early, but it does not appear to have been widely implemented by Ministry stakeholders until late in the Programme.

**Prioritisation by Key Stakeholders**

Further to the above, many key stakeholders (particularly those in the central authority) did not appear to view these initiatives as a priority; some stakeholders indicated this may have emerged from the greater interest in procurement undertaken centrally, as well as poor coordination with provincial stakeholders.

**Provincial Approval and Disbursal Mechanisms**

Once mechanisms and funds were devolved to provincial authorities, additional delays were identified in their local procurement and approval processes, causing further delays in implementation.

## ⚡ Challenging Contexts

Many schools in the target areas were shut for reasons of conflict and insecurity; this made them particularly challenging to access for social mobilisation and other MOE staff.

## ⚡ Limited Accurate Information on Closed Schools

Stakeholders and reports all highlighted substantial challenges in securing accurate information about what schools were closed, and where they could be found. Delays were faced in securing lists in the first place, and when provided could be inaccurate; in several cases, schools listed as closed were found to be fully functional and thriving on arrival of social mobilisation teams.

## ⚡ Facilities Ineligible for Funds

The original Programme Document envisioned the use of these funds for rehabilitation of school facilities (e.g. painting, or roof repair); however, many target schools were found to not have buildings, and were therefore not eligible to receive support in the original programme design.

To begin addressing challenges, allowable works were expanded to include school materials, and at times support for teacher salaries to better incorporate those schools without buildings; the broader team (including UNICEF and MOE stakeholders) redoubled efforts to reopen schools in 2017 and 2018, with some successes in recent months.

## ⬈ Strategy 2.3 Summary Output Table

*Table 10 - Progress Table, Strategy 2.3: Reopen schools*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.4.1 | Organize meetings and focus group discussions for reopening of schools (provincial activity) | Targets | 9 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 100 | - |
| | | Actual | 9 | 22 | - | 29 | 50 | - |
| 2.4.2 | Develop simple mechanism for the utilization of emergency fund | Targets | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2.4.3 | Mobilize SMS for the utilisation of emergency fund for reopening of closed schools[20] | Targets | - | 150 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |

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[20] SMS were not mobilized for emergency funds because goods were procured by PED and delivered to schools.

# Programme Priority 3: Increase the Number of Qualified Female Teachers in Areas with High Gender Disparities

## Strategy 3.1. Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level

> **Social Support System for Female Teachers in Rural Areas**

| Planned completion date: | 2013 |
|---|---|
| Actual completion date: | 2018 (prov.) |

Similar to the communications strategy, development of the relevant output (Female Teacher Relocation Policy) began in 2014 and 2015, with consultants (national and international) procured through central MOE processes. Contracts were not deliverable based, and it appears that substantial delays were experienced in securing required outputs, with the work needing to be retendered and listed in 2016/2017. The policies have been completed and are now awaiting approval by the relevant MOE body, but continued instability and ministerial turnover have posed barriers to finalising this component.

Further to official policies, it does appear the Social Mobilisers and communities undertook ad-hoc response to relevant needs; cases of Social Mobilisers working with local communities to provide free housing, secure jobs for redeployed teachers' husbands, and generally make teachers feel welcomed and valued were cited in several districts. The degree to which this was representative remains unclear, but the findings are nonetheless a positive case of communities filling in central MOE gaps.

**Strategy 3.1 Summary Output Table**

*Table 11 - Progress Table, Strategy 3.1: Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **3.1.1** | Develop communication and social support strategy engaging SMS, community leaders and elders, DEO and PED for female teachers and girls' education | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |

# Strategy 3.2. Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level

> **Recruitment, Redeployment, Incentivisation to Stay in Rural Areas**

*Figure 13: Qualified Female Teacher Contracting*



*Table 12: Recruitment Timeline*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Year of Campaign:** | 2013-2015 |
| **Years Teachers Contracted:** | 2013-2016 |
| **Orientation Provided:** | 2016 |
| **Year of Deployment:** | 2016-2017 |

Hiring processes began in 2013 and were not concluded until 2016; some teachers remain classified as 'contracted' but have yet to be redeployed. The contracting process was initially undertaken through provincial mechanisms, which in the first year saw contracts offered to 120 teachers; however, due diligence undertaken by the GPEPCU and UNICEF found that many contracts were made out to ghost teachers, and others held by individuals with unclear qualifications, experience, and network influence. All contracts were cancelled prior to any salary payments being made, with responsibility for recruitment and contracting handed to the central MOE.

This process was subject to its own set of challenges, with recruitment and contracting taking up to a year, needing to pass through various committees, steps, and validation processes; delays were further compounded by a MOE hiring freeze between 2015 and 2016. Pashto-speaking teachers were particularly challenging to find through this process, at times requiring re-listing of roles to secure sufficient candidates for some provinces. Once contracts were finalised, misalignment with Afghanistan's varying academic calendars and allocation of teachers to their respective schools could lead to further delays of up to six months for re-deployment. In other cases, female teachers would withdraw applications on finding out where they were assigned (Kandahar and Helmand were not often popular destinations), or would drop out due to a change in personal circumstances during the long recruitment-contracting-redeployment process.

The 'orientation' programme, spanning two weeks, was initially intended to be a formal training and qualification activity covering three months and leading to formal qualifications. However, the limited budgets facing other teacher training initiatives in the Programme also limited this planned activity, resulting in the delivery of an abbreviated (two-week) training and orientation programme for most re-deployed teachers in 2016.

## Teacher Training for Adolescent Girls

*Figure 14: Training provided to adolescent teachers*



In the original programme design, adolescent females in formal secondary schools were nominated to receive a complete INSET-I training qualification; the girls would then have both the qualifications and interest in serving as CBE and ALP instructors (potentially even formal school teachers) on completion of their studies. This was considered to be a long-term capacity development initiative, with impacts occurring well after the close of the Programme.

However, these teacher training initiatives faced the same budget challenges as the others, with a scaled-down programme designed, covering only 3-4 days instead of 14. Training was reported during the 3-4-month GPEPCU leadership transition in 2016, and was the only teacher training activity for adolescent girls recording full target achievement. The Third Party Monitoring (TPM) firm was unable to undertake validation of these trainings, as they fell out with their contractual mandate.

## Strategy 3.2 Summary Output Table

*Table 13 - Progress Table, Strategy 3.2: Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.2.1 | Undertake recruitment campaign | Targets | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3.2.2 | Provide two-week orientation training for female teachers identified and recruited for deployment | Targets | 120 | - | - | 300 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | 231 | - | - |
| 3.2.3 | Develop incentive strategy (couple and team deployment; deployment bonus; salary bonus; choices for extension and redeployment; etc.) | Targets | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3.2.4 | Recruitment and contract qualified female teachers | Targets | 120 | 180 | 300 | 300 | 205 | - |
| | | Actual | 117 | 25 | 162 | 231 | 205 | - |
| 3.2.5 | Deploy female teachers along with their spouses in 40 districts | Targets | - | - | - | 138 | 53 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | 74 | 53 | - |

# Programme Priority 4: Streamline Policy and Administrative Systems in the Ministry of Education

## Strategy 4.1. Enhance policy review and development

Similar to the Communications Strategy and other policies discussed previously, development of the relevant outputs began in 2014 and 2015, with consultants (national and international) procured through central MOE processes. Contracts were not deliverable based, and it appears that substantial delays were experienced in securing required outputs, with the work needing to be retendered in 2016/2017. The policies and strategies have, to some extent, been completed, with some endorsed and others now being drafted awaiting finalization and approval by the relevant MOE body, but continued instability and ministerial turnover have posed barriers to finalising this component.

All relevant outputs developed as part of this and other components comprised:

| Strategy/policy | Status | Completion Date |
|---|---|---|
| Social Mobilisation Strategy | Endorsed | September 2017 |
| CBE Outreach Policy | Endorsed | December 2017 |
| Early Education Development Policy | Submitted for endorsement | 15-April-2018 |
| Communication Strategy | Draft version prepared | 30-November-2018 |
| Female Teacher Relocation Policy | Draft version prepared | 31-December-2018 |

### Strategy 4.1 Summary Output Table

*Table 14 - Progress Table, Strategy 4.1: Enhance policy review and development*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1.1 | Develop strategy for policy review, development and dissemination in the MOE, including clear division of tasks; processes; training program; monitoring - Salaries of international consultants | Targets | - | 1 | - | 2 | 1 | - |
| | | Actual | - | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| 4.1.2 | Implement strategy for policy review and development | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4.1.3 | Conduct assessment to identify priority areas for review and development of policies, procedures and standards for the concern department under the MOE | Targets | | | | | | - |
| | | Actual | | | | | | - |
| 4.1.4 | Engage National Technical Advisors to review and develop policies, procedures and standards related to the three other programme priorities: community and social mobilization; | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | - |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | school governance; multiple pathways to education and transition from formal to non-formal; increasing the number of qualified female teachers and enhancing girls' secondary education-Salaries of 4 National Technical Consultants for policy development | Actual | - | - | 1 | 4 | 4 | - |
| **4.1.5** | Provide equipment to the Academic Council and the Technical Advisors | Targets | - | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| **4.1.6** | Disseminate and communicate policies, procedures and standards | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |

# Strategy 4.2. Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring

➢ **Education Planning and Management Training for DEO and PED**

Eight Master Trainers from the MOE's Planning Directorate were budgeted to receive long-term training from the UNESCO National Institute for Educational Planning (NIEP); however, in the three years it took to launch Programme activities, those same staff received support for a Paris-based master's programme in educational planning from another international donor. Funds were re-allocated to other training and capacity building activities within this component, though with a broader and less targeted group of beneficiaries at the Directorate.

These same eight master trainers are being paid under GPE since 2013. These were reported to have delivered one round of cascaded training to 80 people in 2013 (targets were 240 across the Programme period). No additional trainings by these supported Master Trainers have been reported.

➢ **Strengthening EMIS**

Initial phases of the project saw the commission of a needs assessment and set of EMIS improvement recommendations, leading to the procurement of equipment and materials for the office. Sixteen members of staff for the EMIS Department had their salaries supported throughout the Programme period (with some turnover reported). Supports do not appear to have been linked to concrete outputs, with these members of staff appearing to serve in a supporting capacity to the broader activities undertaken by the Department.

The materials and software procured as part of this initiative have been credited by some as underpinning current initiatives by the government to digitise substantial portions of the school enrolment and transfer process, as well as expand the depth, breadth, and quality of data EMIS in Afghanistan. Both the equipment and capacity development initiatives factor into these discussions.

*Table 15 - Progress Table, Strategy 4.2: Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.2.1 | Develop/revise training programme for planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4.2.2 | Salary for the master trainers recruited to train the staff of the MOE. | Targets | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | - |
| | | Actual | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | - |
| 4.2.3 | Train DEO and PED, provincial planning and evaluation Officers on planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. | Targets | 80 | 160 | - | 1 | 110 | - |
| | | Actual | 80 | - | - | - | 110 | - |
| 4.2.4 | Salary for the TAs to mentor civil servants in related programme Directorates in implementation of 3 first Programme Priorities under the Planning & Evaluation Directorate. | Targets | | | | | | - |
| | | Actual | | | | | | - |
| 4.2.5 | Assess responsiveness of EMIS to M&E needs of MOE and partners at district, provincial and central levels | Targets | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Actual | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| 4.2.6 | Salary for the system developers and IT analyst to develop further systems and modules for EMIS at central and provincial levels. | Targets | 8 | 16 | 16 | 13 | 13 | - |
| | | Actual | 8 | 15 | 15 | 12 | 13 | - |
| 4.2.7 | Equipment and running cost for the EMIS module development | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| 4.2.8 | Develop an integrated system that includes school and spot surveys and other third-party testing and assessments in EMIS | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | 1 | - |

# Strategy 4.3. Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE

➢ **Creation of the GPE Programme Coordination Unit in the central MOE**

The GPEPCU was created in 2013, with recruitment starting in 2012. Relevant staff had their salaries supported across the Programme period, and equipment was procured for the MOE-based office. Some delays in filling key roles may have resulted in delays across other key activities. Other members of staff were hired in support of the GPEPCU, and embedded in other departments (e.g. Planning Directorate, Finance) to support both GPE Programme activities (receiving first priority) as well as wider departmental requirements; 13 provincial financial managers were hired mid-programme to reduce delays and transparency concerns associated with provincial processes. This latter initiative may underpin some acceleration of province-implemented activities in 2017 and 2018 (e.g. school reopening, and procurement of school kits).

While it was initially planned and budgeted to provide capacity-building training for GPEPCU staff early in the programme, it was not undertaken until early 2017 with a change in Unit leadership. Early Programme staff indicated this was because the internationally-based training budgets were not necessary, given that most of the GPEPCU team was well qualified and required only more targeted, local, and short-term training in specific skillsets. However, a series of capacity development trainings were deemed and conducted for the GPEPCU staff and they were benefited from required trainings in 2017.

Some additional challenges were seen across the Unit's activities:

### ⚡ GPEPCU, not Wider MOE, as Owner of GPE Programme

Many stakeholders cited challenges emerging in the perceived GPEPCU ownership of activities, resulting in slowed implementation. Where barriers or delays were encountered in other MOE departments or systems, limited support was offered. This appeared to result from a lack of ownership of Programme activities by the wider MOE, with both the MOE and beneficiaries often seeing the programme as a UNICEF initiative rather than one delivered by the government.

### ⚡ Political Appointments and Staff Turnover

The GPEPCU, as with the wider MOE, faced some challenges stemming from mid-programme political appointments of key staff, or more general staff turnover; this could at times result in delays while new staff familiarised themselves with the focus and requirements of their new roles.

### ⚡ General Systemic Challenges at the MOE

MOE systems are subject to a high degree of systemic inertia, with limited scope for circumvention, change, or improvement by external actors; this was no different for staff seeking to implement the Programme. Political manoeuvring was sometimes seen as a compounding factor, with the Programme subject to varying degrees of interest, support, and leverage within broader political conflicts.

### 🔗 Strategy 4.3 Summary Output Table

*Table 16 - Progress Table, Strategy 4.3: Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE*

| Activity Description | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.3.1** | Implement resource mobilization function/**Salary for the member of the unit for 6 months** | Targets | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | - |
| | | Actual | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | - |

52

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.3.2** | Provide for operation and equipment/Establishment cost for the coordination unit such as office set-up, furniture, communication, etc. | Targets | 8 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 2 | - |
| | | Actual | 8 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1 | - |
| **4.3.3** | Develop strategy/ToRs for Programme Coordination Unit and Rally MOE departments to endorse strategy/Capacity development of the GPE Coordination Team. | Targets | - | 1 | - | 6 | 6 | - |
| | | Actual | - | - | - | - | 3 | - |
| **4.3.4** | Implement internal and external management coordination function/ Provide support to Finance and Accounting Department, Procurement Department, Human Recourses Management Unit and Academic Supervision Department. | Targets | 12 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 13 | - |
| | | Actual | 12 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 13 | - |

# Actions Taken to Address Challenges and Delays

Toward the end of 2016 and in the beginning of 2017, the pace of delivery accelerated substantially; discussions with stakeholders attributed the shift in pace to a few key factors and activities:

### ⚒ Early Actions Paying Dividends

Throughout 2013-2016, action was taken to address many early challenges; examples of this include: replacement of key Programme staff at the provincial and central level; hiring of additional TAs to provide needed capacity at key bottlenecks (e.g. 13 provincial finance staff); redesign of key programme components to address shortfalls in initial design (e.g. MBE programmes, SIP cost underestimates); and others described in the preceding pages. The lifting of the hiring freeze was another key factor in the escalation of pace seen in 2016 and 2017. Given the pace at which centralised institutions change in Afghanistan, it took several years for these changes to begin paying dividends.

### ⚒ New UNICEF GPE Team in 2016/2017

A new UNICEF team arrived in Afghanistan by early 2017 and began driving initiatives forward by implementing a range of new systems and coordination activities. They benefitted substantially from the work done by their predecessors, continuing to build on these to further improve Programme progress.

### ⚒ New GPEPCU Staff in 2016/2017

Around the same time, new leadership arrived in the GPEPCU. The appointees appeared to have the MoE's management support, working closely with other actors in the MOE in ways which may have been better aligned to the ministry's wider approach. The

injection of new staff into the GPEPCU, supported by UNICEF efforts to support and galvanise them, was credited with bringing new pace to the GPE Programme.

### Shift in Teacher Salary Payment Systems in 2016

In 2016, teacher salary payment systems shifted from the PED-focused models (discussed in previous section) to direct disbursal to a teacher's nominated bank account. This is credited with shortening some of the delays associated in teacher salary payments and accelerating the rate of recruitment for some teaching roles falling within the GPE Programme's activities.

### Monthly Coordination Meetings

On arrival of the new teams, UNICEF and the GPEPCU implemented monthly coordination meetings, requiring the participation of all departments involved in GPE Programme implementation (e.g. Finance, Procurement, ISD, the Planning Directorate, etc.). Representatives from each department were expected to present detailed status updates, describing the status, challenges, requirements, and next steps involved in their areas of programme responsibility. Prior to this, meetings may have seen narrower participation; coordination and communication between concerned departments was consequently characterised as weak.

### Fiduciary Oversight, Third-party Monitoring

The new teams also drove initiatives to promote improved transparency over budgets, financial resources, and activities. The fiduciary advisory firm (KPMG) was replaced, with the new firm (GTA) required to provide more frequent and detailed reports on budgets, payments, and other relevant financial information. This was credited with providing the financial insights needed to ensure effective planning on a month-to-month basis.

The new financial advisory firm was also tasked with third-party field monitoring, requiring validation of programme activities, seeking to ensure that works, activities, and enrolment had occurred as reported; this was similarly reported to be helpful in driving accomplishments forward.

Finally, the UNICEF and GPEPCU team redoubled efforts to ensure the MOE met its previously unmet commitments; the activities provided additional insight, and MOE ownership, of the GPE Programme's activities.

### Engagement with Senior Ministry Leadership

The team also undertook to gain the backing and support of senior ministry leadership, appealing to the Deputy Minister on up to the Minister in cases where support was not forthcoming or subject to delay. The support from these stakeholders was further credited with driving accelerated implementation.

## Results Framework Outcomes

## Primary Outcome

The overall outcome of the GPE Programme is increased (15%), sustained and equitable access to education (15%) in the target districts.

Establishing such outcomes as a percentage of total enrolment in the target districts is a challenge; CBE and ALP enrolment (at the outset of the programme period and now) is not systematically tracked, making such evaluations difficult.

Nonetheless, it does appear that both access and equity have been improved in the course of the Programme, and that some of these expansions are likely to extend beyond the programme period. The highest numbers were achieved in 2016, when the programme benefitted 72,585 children (33,988 boys and 38,597 girls); the programme also undertook to ensure transitions for 58,474 children from supported schools to hub schools on Programme close. A further breakdown of access achievements can be found below:

| | | CBE Enrolment | Transitioned CBE Enrolment | ALP Enrolment | Transitioned ALP Enrolment | MBE Enrolment | Reopened School Enrolment | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2013** | Male | 10,929 | - | 4,650 | - | 10,078 | - | 25,657 |
| | Female | 11,223 | - | 3,809 | - | 13,163 | - | 28,195 |
| | Total | 22,152 | - | 8,459 | - | 23,241 | - | 53,852 |
| **2014** | Male | 5,629 | - | 3,746 | - | 7,149 | - | 16,524 |
| | Female | 6,448 | - | 2,986 | - | 10,359 | - | 19,793 |
| | Total | 12,077 | - | 6,732 | - | 17,508 | - | 36,317 |
| **2015** | Male | 5,298 | 4,243 | 884 | 956 | 19,512 | - | 30,893 |
| | Female | 6,648 | 3,814 | 1,051 | 798 | 28,538 | - | 40,849 |
| | Total | 11,946 | 8,057 | 1,935 | 1,754 | 48,050 | - | 71,742 |
| **2016** | Male | 4,441 | 7,447 | 1,016 | 3,061 | 18,023 | - | 33,988 |
| | Female | 2,975 | 6,940 | 593 | 3,215 | 24,874 | - | 38,597 |
| | Total | 7,416 | 14,387 | 1,609 | 6,276 | 42,897 | - | 72,585 |
| **2017** | Male | - | 9,878 | - | 3,020 | - | 7,034 | 19,932 |
| | Female | - | 9,341 | - | 2,761 | - | 1,437 | 13,539 |
| | Total | - | 19,219 | - | 5,781 | - | 8,471 | 33,471 |
| **2018** | Male | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Female | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Total | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

# Sub-Outcomes

◎ **Increased community engagement in and around schools in targeted districts**

It does appear that community engagement has been improved in the course of programming, building on the establishment of SMSs, creation of community accountability mechanisms, and deployment of social mobilisation staff to target areas in support of communities. A summary of key outcomes comprises:

- 3 sets training materials and guidelines for social mobilizers were developed, improving potential staff development capacity at the MOE;
- 482 district social mobilizers and 61 provincial coordinators received training, as well as salaries and communication & transportation allowances, supporting their efforts to ensure effective community mobilization and expansion of school access, equity, and quality;
- 122 bi-monthly meetings were conducted among social mobilizers, DEOs and PEDs (6 meetings/year for 13 provinces), as well as many quarterly review workshops, supporting effective coordination across the sector;
- 343 regular events were organised at district and provincial level on awareness for education (8 events/year/province), complemented by SMS field monitoring visits, supporting communities in taking responsibility for education delivery in their own contexts;
- A national communication strategy has been drafted which will be endorsed and implemented by 2018, supporting the MOE and national stakeholders in effective communication and coordination in the education sector; and
- 839 SMSs were trained in participatory SIP development, and school oversight, supporting their ability to effectively oversee education programming in their community.

◎ **Improved school performance in targeted districts.**

The qualified female teacher relocation initiative may well have had an impact on quality, as substantial relevant research has demonstrated positive impacts on quality and learning by such programmes (UNESCO, 2008); such successes may offer instruction to future efforts. Such long-term initiatives, versus short-term training, have demonstrably positive impact on teacher performance (Antoniou, 2015), particularly where subject knowledge is a substantial challenge (Ko, 2014). While it is a challenge to establish improved performance through the measurement of inputs, gains in this area may well have been achieved. Some achievements in this area include:

- 231 female teachers were trained on effective education in rural areas;
- 74 qualified urban female teachers deployed and incentivised to stay in rural schools, raising standards of education in those areas; and
- 3,136 bright adolescent girls were reported to receive teacher training, potentially creating a new cadre of more effective teachers.

◎ **Schools in targeted districts have safer, conducive learning environments for children.**

SIPs as designed may well have had a positive impact on this indicator, providing children with appropriate hand wash facilities or boundary walls; similarly, if protection training provided to relevant educators has had a positive impact, then this to may well have had a positive impact on this indicator. Furthermore, the capacity of government to support schools, thereby raising input quality over the long term, is also thought to have improved substantially. A summary of relevant outputs has been provided below:

- 780 school grants were provided for SIP implementation;
- 77 Engineers (including 3 senior engineers) were hired to implement SIPs; and
- 839 SMS trained in SIP oversight, and other relevant areas important to the creation and management of safe and conducive learning environments.

◎ **Improved monitoring of multiple pathways to education in targeted districts.**

Monitoring implemented by Social Mobilisers implemented as part of the GPE Programme may well have improved capacity, as well as TPM monitoring capacity overseen by UNICEF; CBE data is intended to be included within EMIS systems, with plans in place

to continue building capacity. From a short-term pragmatic perspective, the GPE programme certainly has improved capacities in this regard, with systemic and sustainable improvements beyond the end of funding under continued development.

- School mapping tools used in 2,100 cases to identify under-served areas where CBE classes are required and in 1,258 cases to identify under-served areas where ALP classes are required, with tools continuing to inform current government programmes for CBE, ALP, and hub school monitoring.

◎ **Increased number of reopened closed schools in targeted districts.**

Schools do appear to have been reopened in several districts; although earlier implementation may have improved the potential impacts of this set of activities. Nonetheless, out of 300 planned schools, 52 schools were reopened in the course of programming, with MOE and community actors improving their capacities with regard to effective administration and oversight of future relevant initiatives. A summary of relevant achievements in this area comprises:

- All staff in reopened schools included in Tashkeel (official civil servants), with the government working to re-locate teachers in support of reopened schools;
- 110 meetings and focus group discussions were organised for reopening of schools (provincial activity), supporting local and national governments in understanding needs; and
- 52 schools were reopened through community engagement.

◎ **Increased number of female teachers in targeted districts.**

Female teacher training initiatives, and female teacher relocation initiatives will almost certainly have had an impact on this indicator. However, such outputs should be seen within the broader context of relevant need in Afghanistan which remains substantial. An overview of achievements across the programme comprise:

- 231 female teachers identified and recruited for deployment were provided with a two-week orientation training;
- 231 qualified female teachers were recruited and contracted;
- 74 qualified female teachers were deployed, and incentivised to stay, along with their spouses or family members in 40 districts; and
- 3,136 adolescent girls were trained as teachers.

◎ **MOE empowered in policy development, planning and management, EMIS and data collection and analysis, internal and external coordination, and resource mobilisation.**

The programme was cited as informing substantial improvements in MOE capacity at the central and provincial levels. Gains in financial management, EMIS infrastructure and activity, as well as in policy and administration, were all seen to emerge from the programme. Preceding analyses go into substantial additional detail. However, in the absence of donor funding, retaining some of these capacities may prove challenging. Further to this, substantial challenges remain with regard to coordination, monitoring, and resource mobilisation at the Ministry. It is unclear the degree to which Programme inputs have minimised challenges, or shortened delays in resource mobilisation.

◎ **Improved aid effectiveness and resource mobilisation in Afghanistan.**

The lessons learned from GPE programme informed the development of a new multi-donor programme, entitled EQRA; the new programme (the GPE programme's replacement in many respects) merges funding from multiple sources that were previously completely independent; funds come from the GPE ($100m USD), Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Funds ($100m USD) and International Development Assistance ($100m

USD). These programmes have been placed into multi-donor programme, which will be fully fungible, with no separate requirements according to the sources of funding. Such initiatives have required the cross-organisational coordination of actors who have previously had limited engagement and is thought to improve the effectiveness of aid as a result. This programme offers opportunities to support the NESP III and its reform process in a manner more consistent with aid effectiveness principles.

Further to this, aid actors are developing a new joint Annual Operational Plan for 2019, which will seek to align the activities of the MOE and development partners in a systematic, effective, and efficient manner.

Stakeholders indicated lessons learned from the GPE programme have driven many of these initiatives.

# GPE Programme Overarching Targets – Achievement Summary

The below table addresses achievement of additional targets specified by the original Pro-gramme Document.

**Areas and Schools**

| Target | Overall Achievement |
|---|---|
| 13 provinces supported | Achieved |
| 40 out of 55 targeted districts supported | Achieved |
| 1,000 schools are supported with School Im-provement Plans (SIP)s | 1116 school grants were successfully pro-vided for SIP implementation |
| 2,100 Community-based Education (CBE) classes are established | 2,038 Community-based Education (CBE) classes were established |
| 800 Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALPs) are established | 762 Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALPs) were established |
| 6,000 mosques with trained mullahs for more effective MBE | 5,310 mosques with trained mullahs for more effective MBE |
| 300 reopened schools | 52 reopened schools |

**Schools**

| Target | Overall Achievement |
|---|---|
| 63,000 (all new) students (37,800 girls) bene-fiting from CBE classes | As many as 27,387 children per year were enrolled in supported CBEs across the pro-gramme period. Total enrolment across the programme comprised: 64,784 (32,711 boys and 32,073 girls). |
| 20,000 (14,000 new) students (14,000 girls) benefiting from ALP classes | 21,394 students enrolled in ALP classes (95% of target), of which 11,484 were girls |

**Communities**

| Target | Overall Achievement |
|---|---|
| 120 social mobilizers recruited and deployed | Social mobilizers were recruited and de-ployed, with numbers remaining relatively stable from year-to-year (accounting for normal turnover); recruited totals com-prised: 111 in 2013; 96 in 2014; 91 in 2015; 109 in 2016; and 75 in 2017 (the target was reduced to 77). |
| 13 provincial social mobilization coordinators recruited and deployed | 13 provincial social mobilization coordina-tors recruited and deployed, with the num-ber broadly maintained from year-to-year. |
| 1,500 engaged leaders and elders for educa-tion in the 13 Provinces and in Afghanistan in general | n/a |

**Teachers**

| Target | Overall Achievement |
|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| 300 female teachers trained and deployed to rural areas with spouses (300) to be employed as teachers or administrative staff in nearby boys' schools | 231 qualified female teachers received pre-deployment 'orientation' to this end. 74 qualified female teachers were deployed in 2016, and incentivised to stay, along with their spouses or family members in 40 districts. |
| 1,100 local female teachers trained and employed | 3,136 adolescent girls were trained as teachers to this end. |

**Training material, strategies and policies**

| Target | Overall Achievement |
|---|---|
| Training material for social mobilizers developed and deployed | Achieved |
| Training programme in planning and management for DEO and PED staff | 190 DEO and PED, provincial planning and evaluation Officers trained on planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. |

# 5 Financial Report

## Annual Summary – Programme Strategy Budgets

## Programme Priority 1: Strengthen community and social mobilisation and governance systems at the local level

Strategy 1.1: Enhance community and social mobilization



|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget(USD)** | 900,245 | 1,588,100 | 1,431,000 | 1,224,636 | 426,355 | - |
| **Actual Spent** | 817,199 | 1,077,964 | 895,463 | 736,789 | 358,591 | - |
| **Unspent** | 83,046 | 510,136 | 535,537 | 487,847 | 67,764 | - |

Spending for Strategy 1.1 and its activities was hampered by challenges in finding qualified professionals; hiring freezes mid-project which limited the ability of the programme to account for normal staff turnover; insecurity; and the remote locations in which the schools operated. Consequently, activities relating to salary and transportation allowances faced challenges in meeting their budget allowances (86%), organising regular social mobilisation events met less than half its allocated budget allowance (48%), indicating Social Mobilisation activity may have been able to achieve broader participation with available resources.

|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 2,019,931 | 11,285,610 | 7,471,040 | 9,739,193 | 10,453,299 | 5,918,758 |
| **Actual Spent** | 49,931 | 4,471,775 | 1,484,603 | 3,544,474 | 2,870,479 | 3,347,838 |
| **Unspent** | 1,970,000 | 6,813,835 | 5,986,437 | 6,194,719 | 7,582,820 | 2,570,920 |

SIP grants and training for Shuras in governance and school assessments were hampered by slow government systems, which delayed the payment of grants and approval/implementation of school improvement projects. Consequently, less than a third of funds allocated to school grants and assessment projects had been spent by 15th July 2018. It is of note that spending increased from 2015,2016,2017 and 2018 If the pace of the Afghan government approving grants quickened substantially.

# Programme Priority 2: Expand and reinforce multiple pathways to education



Strategy 2.1: Expand access to CBE and ALP

|  | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** | **2017** | **2018** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 238,516 | 3,341,149 | 4,896,961 | 4,924,050 | 2,203,810 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 238,515 | 1,604,551 | 2,884,495 | 3,228,632 | 1,921,404 | - |

Strategy 2.1 and its individual initiatives were largely successful in spending its allocated budgets. Although the almost complete use of allocated funds in 2013 is testament to teacher salary and TLM procurement targets largely being met for both CBE and ALP streams in the first year; however, ongoing challenges in other areas (e.g. late teacher salary payments, rising urgency in other priorities, and ongoing security challenges) resulted in a decline in CBE programming budget expenditure from near 100% in 2013, to c. 50% - 65% in subsequent years.



Strategy 2.2: Expand access to ALP for over-age students, especially girls

|  | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** | **2017** | **2018** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 148,589 | 2,454,958 | 2,060,000 | 2,153,250 | 823,988 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 148,589 | 1,148,624 | 1,461,341 | 1,546,160 | 796,291 | - |

Whilst initiatives related to teacher training and enrolling over-age students had relatively high rates of budget expenditure (70%), less successful initiatives were the utilisation of mapping tools to identify under-served areas for ALP education – with less than 20% of budget allocated to mapping exercises spent throughout the duration analysed. It is likely this emerged from initial overestimates of cost associated with this activity, and the relatively rapid recruitment of ALP teachers.



Strategy 2.3: Strengthen mosque-based education

|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 123,788 | 2,092,750 | 2,400,000 | 2,663,450 | 45,030 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 73,787 | 652,335 | 1,184,724 | 1,354,699 | - | - |

Strengthening mosque-based education spent c. 45% of its allocated budget, in spite of achievements in programme targets; this is likely attributable to underestimates of stipends and costs associated with TLMs, which the programme undertook to remedy by raising mullah stipends and procuring materials in excess of original programme plans. Delays in the training of mullahs were also apparent, only operable in 2016, spending 40% of its budget.

**Strategy 2.4: Reopen schools**



|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 4,080 | 865,000 | 180,000 | 80,000 | 20,000 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 4,081 | 8,747 | - | 5,800 | 10,537 | - |

The strategy to reopen schools did not spend much of its allocated budget, with spending averaging c. 15% of funds allocated for the initiative. It is thought spending in this area will have accelerated in recent months; totals will be updated as new spending reports are submitted on Programme close.

# Programme Priority 3: Increase the number of qualified female teachers in areas with high gender disparities

**Strategy 3.1: Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level**

|            | 2013 | 2014  | 2015  | 2016   | 2017 | 2018 |
|------------|------|-------|-------|--------|------|------|
| Budget     | -    | 7,500 | 7,500 | 15,000 | -    | -    |
| Actual Spend | -  | -     | -     | -      | -    | -    |

The strategy to develop support systems for female teachers did not spend its allocated budget; this may be because its development was integrated in other components and because the relevant policy has only recently been completed (with expenditure to be declared in upcoming reports).

Strategy 3.2: Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level



|              | 2013    | 2014      | 2015      | 2016      | 2017      | 2018 |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------|
| Budget       | 287,296 | 3,428,100 | 2,892,500 | 2,851,800 | 1,855,272 | -    |
| Actual Spend | 254,685 | 1,219,329 | 1,009,070 | 1,446,196 | 1,675,102 | -    |

As was discussed in previous sections, it appears that some recruitment was undertaken (and teacher salaries paid) before teachers were deployed to rural districts; delays in disbursal of salaries and relocation allowances are thought to have something to do with this, as have some delays in relevant MOE departments allocating teachers to their new locations.

Strategy 3.3: Develop a system for recruitment, training and employment of female teachers at the local level

| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | - | - | 100,800 | 270,000 | - | - |
| **Actual Spend** | - | - | 104,437 | 266,888 | - | - |

The strategy to train female teachers was able to spend 98% of its allocated budget in 2015 and 2016, once again subject to earlier-discussed challenges in appropriate allocation of funds to teacher training initiatives.

# Programme Priority 4: Streamline policy and administrative systems in the Ministry of Education

Strategy 4.1: Enhance policy review and development



| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 0 | 626,500 | 159,020 | 321,261 | 205,376 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 0 | 21,000 | 69,930 | 71,846 | 190,036 | - |

Although key initiatives such as providing equipment to the ACBS have been completed, enhancing policy review and development was subject to some delay in closing deliverables and completing policy documents commissioned from consultants. Nevertheless, actual spend over allocated budget increased by 89% between 2014 and 2017 due to successes in engaging technical advisors, and escalation of progress in the last two years.

Strategy 4.2: Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring

|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 209,541 | 2,203,900 | 1,480,900 | 2,005,507 | 1,361,027 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 209,541 | 461,508 | 599,749 | 600,025 | 946,477 | - |

A significant element of Strategy 4.2 included the provision of salaries for system developers and master trainers, with the Programme achieving certain successes in spending its budget – with 88% of the budget allocated to salaries and staffing costs spent. However, budgets allocated to EMIS support for equipment and relevant operating (non-staff) costs significantly underspent, as did cascade training and capacity development initiatives, with discharge of only 14% of total funds allocated. This may have emerged from initial overestimates of need with regard to equipment and operating cost requirements.

Strategy 4.3: Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE



|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Budget** | 354,476 | 866,024 | 724,525 | 759,418 | 437,273 | - |
| **Actual Spend** | 321,738 | 583,216 | 453,006 | 449,802 | 345,308 | - |

A significant increase in GPE budget after 2013 can be explained by the growing quantity of staff supported within the GPEPCU; some shortfalls in spending between 2015 and 2016 are attributable to hiring freezes, making replacement of staff a challenge. Capacity building initiatives for the Unit spent less than 50% of their allocated budgets, and with expenditure coming late in the Programme.

# Annual Summary – Programme Priority Budgets

■ Actual Spend   ■ Unspent Budget



Priority 1

| 8,000,000 |
| 6,000,000 |
| 4,000,000 |
| 2,000,000 |
| - |
| (2,000,000) |
| (4,000,000) |
| (6,000,000) |
| (8,000,000) |
| (10,000,000) |

2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018

■ Actual Spend   ■ Unspent

Priority 2

| 8,000,000 |
| 6,000,000 |
| 4,000,000 |
| 2,000,000 |
| - |
| (2,000,000) |
| (4,000,000) |
| (6,000,000) |

2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018

■ Actual Spend   ■ Unspent

Priority 3

| 2,000,000 |
| 1,500,000 |
| 1,000,000 |
| 500,000 |
| - |
| (500,000) |
| (1,000,000) |
| (1,500,000) |
| (2,000,000) |
| (2,500,000) |

2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018

■ Actual Spend   ■ Unspent

Priority 4

| 2,000,000 |
| - |
| (2,000,000) |
| (4,000,000) |

2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018

■ Actual Spend   ■ Unspent

68

| | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Priority 1** | Budget | 2,990,293 | 12,993,710 | 8,982,040 | 11,046,629 | 10,919,654 | 5,918,758 |
| | Spent | 867,130 | 5,573,183 | 2,449,381 | 4,086,881 | 3,268,469 | 3,347,838 |
| **Priority 2** | Budget | 514,973 | 9,182,949 | 9,839,711 | 9,820,750 | 3,092,828 | - |
| | Spent | 464,972 | 3,414,257 | 5,530,560 | 6,135,291 | 2,728,232 | - |
| **Priority 3** | Budget | 292,296 | 3,428,100 | 3,000,500 | 3,126,000 | 1,855,272 | - |
| | Spent | 254,685 | 1,219,329 | 1,113,507 | 1,713,084 | 1,675,102 | - |
| **Priority 4** | Budget | 564,017 | 3,796,424 | 2,364,445 | 3,086,186 | 2,003,676 | - |
| | Spent | 531,279 | 1,065,724 | 1,122,685 | 1,121,673 | 1,481,821 | - |
| **Total** | Budget | 4,361,579 | 29,401,183 | 24,186,696 | 27,079,565 | 17,871,430 | 5,918,758 |
| **Total** | Spent | 2,118,066 | 11,272,493 | 10,216,133 | 13,056,929 | 9,153,624 | 3,347,838 |
| Total | Unspent | 2,243,513 | 18,128,690 | 13,970,563 | 14,022,636 | 8,717,806 | 2,570,920 |
| % | Spent | 49% | 38% | 42% | 48% | 51% | 57% |
| % | Unspent | 51% | 62% | 58% | 52% | 49% | 43% |

Across the Programme Priorities, underspending consistently hovered between 40%-65% on annual budgets. Priority 1, with its challenges in implementing SIP grants, faced the most substantial challenges in this regard, with both real and relative underspend.

# Annual Summary – GPE Programme Total Budget



Across the annual GPE Programme budgets, underspent dropped below 50% only in 2017 and 2018; consistent challenges in meeting spending targets highlights the challenges faced in Programme implementation. Challenges working through central procurement, finance, and HR systems can be seen as primary factors underpinning challenges in using resources, particularly within the SIP grant component of Priority 1.

# End-of-Programme Budget Summary

**End-of-programme Summary by Priority and GPE Programme Total (to 15th July 2018)**



| Priorities | Budget | Spent till 15th July 2018 | Unspent till 15th July 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Programme Priority 1: Strengthen community and social mobilization and governance systems at the local level | 24,115,202 | 19,814,492 | 4,300,710 |
| Programme Priority 2: Expand and re-inforce multiple pathways to education | 19,616,603 | 18,722,045 | 894,558 |
| Programme Priority 3: Increase the number of qualified female teachers in areas with high gender disparities | 6,140,288 | 5,960,119 | 180,169 |
| Programme Priority 4: Streamline policy and administrative systems in the Ministry of Education | 5,827,783 | 5,669,382 | 158,401 |

While annual budgets consistently underutilised available funds, multiple NCEs gave the Programme time to use most resources toward achieving programme targets. Programme Priority 1 (as of 2017) still had 38% of its initial budget to spend, while the remaining components have only 10%.

| | |
|---|---|
| **GPE Programme Total Budget** | **55,700,001** |
| Total expenditure 2013-2018 | 50,166,038 |
| Unspent | 5,533,838 |

As of 15th July 2018, Programme has come to an end and all remaining funds from the GPE Programme grant have been refunded on September 19, 2018; this comprises 10% of total funds.

# 6  Key Challenges and Lessons Learned

This section examines the challenges and lessons learned identified during the review of GPE programme reports and documentation, in order to determine what lessons can be drawn for future programming.

### Procurement and Hiring Processes

Procurement and hiring procedures face capacity challenges and long delays, resulting in recruitment timelines holding up other important project components (e.g. SM re-cruitment delay, SIP procurement delay, female teachers' redeployment, etc.); these impact substantially on the effectiveness and efficiency of programming, and continu-ally undermine project timelines. Other concerns have been highlighted regarding the transparency of such processes, with candidate selection subject to a high degree of opacity past initial rounds of recruitment, particularly at the Provincial level.

### Centralised Financial Systems

Bureaucratic and administrative challenges pertaining to the centralised financial sys-tem have raised some significant programmatic issues, including systemic delays with salary dispersals (as well as dispersal of expenses, etc.), potentially exacerbated by a multi-level distribution system (central to provincial, provincial to district). This also impacts on the efficiency with which necessary goods and services can be procured. In some instances, particularly in relation to the provision of transport, these issues have a substantial, and negative, impact on programming.

### Political Nature of the Ministry of Education

As in a range of international contexts, high turnover within the executive levels of the Ministry (including an instance in which there were three ministers of education within a three-month period), impacts significantly on the ability to sustain consistent policy agendas, and ensure buy-in from the civil service, and from wider stakeholder groups – likewise, concerns over turnover can limit incentives to support new initiatives, due to a perception that priorities may shift again within a short time-frame. Further to chal-lenges with sustainability of staff at the highest levels, some have estimated that up to 70% of the positions at the MOE are filled by appointment, exacerbating challenges relating to continuity and stability of staffing in the government-driven education sec-tor. Political factors have, in some cases, resulted in decision-making that potentially reflected political motivation (rather than pragmatic, or evidence-based policy).

### Focus on High-cost Construction and Infrastructure

Capital expenditure on the construction, or purchase, of physical infrastructure has comprised a significant portion of funds allocated. Evidence from a range of interna-tional sources suggests that, once minimum standards of provision are met with regard to facilities, the most significant factor impacting on learning outcomes is teacher qual-ity; it may, therefore, be prudent to consider a reappraisal of funding priorities to ensure that maximum impact is achieved, with the resources that are available. Civil works also have a high risk of fund 'leakage' arising from compliance issues, as well as issues with cost escalation; the recent MEC report goes into substantial detail on many of these challenges.

### Anti-government Forces, and 'Legitimacy'

Following the withdrawal of ISAF forces from several regions in which programming is taking place, there is a risk that anti-government forces could potentially seek to utilise GPE Programming and finances to consolidate their control of regions, seeking to benefit from the legitimacy which provision of new services can provide, or to exercise undue influence over education programmes. Effective and robust counter measures should be established to protect against this risk, which could cause both reputational damage, and impact on issues of security, and access to education for girls and women.

### Wide Consultation in Costings and Approaches

Programmes were at times designed and costed without consulting the relevant stakeholders (see teacher training programmes, and challenges faced in coordination with TED), leading to delays of three years in some cases until donor approvals could be secured for re-allocation of funding.

### Remote and Insecure Districts

The remote locations of several districts hamper consistent central oversight of progress on the ground, particularly with regard to verification of works. This is exacerbated further by ongoing security challenges, which can render districts inaccessible for long periods of time. These challenges were the most consistently cited reasons underpinning delays in nearly every field-based activity.

### Availability of Qualified Staff at District Level

There are systemic issues undermining the recruitment, and retention, of qualified staff at district levels. This stems from a reliance on central hiring (potentially excluding otherwise qualified candidates from participating in the process in Kabul), an unwillingness of capable candidates to work in remote areas, the necessity of frequent travel (undermined by delays with funding approvals), and a lack of opportunities for professional development and career progression outside urban centres.

### Initial Delays in Funding Approval and Disbursal

Initial delays, at an early stage, in securing legal agreements, and achieving requirements for disbursement, has impacted on programming time-frames, resulting in ongoing issues with scheduling.

### Limited Coordination between Central, Provincial, District Levels

Programming has been, in part, undermined by capacity issues relating to coordination between and within Central, Provincial, and District level offices. Systemic reform of communication and coordination systems is essential to minimise inefficiencies, strengthen accountability, improve outcomes, and reduce the risk of ongoing delays.

### Shifts from NGO- to a Centralised Delivery Model

Early shifts from an NGO-focused model of delivery to a centralised MOE model did not appear to consider government capacity to implement; this led to substantial delays in

programming, with limited capacity improvements identified by the end of the programme. However, valid concerns were raised regarding the capacity of NGOs to implement the project as originally designed. Other stakeholders pointed out the limited inter-organisational coordination at the national level, making it a challenge to know who is operating where; such challenges may well have resulted in delays.

### Uneven Openness in Target Communities

Some communities were reportedly more reticent to accept support than others, requiring more time for advocacy and building of trust. This necessarily led to delays in implementation. But while the programme is ending, many communities expressed much satisfaction over the GPE programme implementation and its benefits for the education of their children. They have demanded for further sustainability and expansion of the programme in their areas.

### Some Support not Linked to Outputs

In several cases, support and funds were provided but not linked to any clear conditions or outputs; this includes the work given to consultants, as well as the EMIS and Master Training inputs in Priority 4. In these cases, funds and contracts were provided, with no accountability mechanisms put in place to ensure resulting outputs; as a consequence, programmes were subject to substantial delay, targets were met to some extent, and in some cases there was very little to show for funds provided.

### Monitoring of Outputs and Activities

There is a need for strengthened Monitoring and Evaluation of outputs and activities. There were some clear early efforts made to establish these, potentially undermined by a range of shifts in strategy and a lack of follow-up on the part of key Programme partners. This is particularly the case in relation to record-keeping of meetings and training sessions, in which there has been inconsistency in the recording of participant data. Likewise, there are systemic issues regarding enrolment numbers, with government-owned Monitoring and Evaluation data receiving insufficient external validation (and with frequent inconsistencies identified), as well as limited data on schools generally.

### Cost Escalation

There have been substantial challenges faced with regard to cost escalation, particularly in relation to civil works. Further research is needed to explore whether these stem from initial 'under-costing', or result from insufficiently robust project management oversight. There is also a risk of this arising from 'leakage' of funds – thus suggesting a need for strengthened financial and compliance controls.

### Compliance and Transparency

Issues of compliance, transparency, and nepotism have the potential to significantly undermine the success of programming efforts, as well as impact the effectiveness of staffing, and the strength of oversight. Such challenges have been widely identified as ongoing challenges within the MOE and wider Afghan government. It is important that continued efforts be made to strengthen both compliance (with a view to reducing costs, and improving efficiency), and transparency (to improve accountability, and community 'buy in').

### Unclear Impacts on Quality and Relevant Outcomes

Quality of state education in Afghanistan remains very poor. While progress continues to be made with programming, the demonstrable impact on learning outcomes is unclear. In particular, there is little evidence to suggest that civil works-focused, and physical infrastructure, interventions have a substantive impact on the quality of education received. Furthermore, those projects with the greatest potential to impact positively on learning outcomes were subject to substantial delays, and did not appear to be the priority of the MOE. Further investigation may be required to assess whether the impact of infrastructure investments sufficiently justifies the level of expenditure, in a context of limited resources.

### Systemic Uncertainty

Frequent turnover within the Ministry and shifting policy agendas have led to a degree of systemic uncertainty with regard to future programming approaches, and delivery mechanisms, particularly with regard to Hub School construction, and associated arrangements. Further to this, different departments within the ministry, and across different ministries, continue to release conflicting and inconsistent guidance and policy (e.g. presidential guidance to downscale reliance on Technical Assistants (TAs), while key MOE staff demand more), or undertaking projects with overlapping and potentially conflicting programme aims. A shift toward consistent, long-term, policies, with limited shifts of focus, would serve to address this challenge.

### Prioritisation of Infrastructure over Quality Investments

Initiatives in areas likely to deliver the greatest impact (on the basis of international evidence), most notably investments in teacher quality (training, etc.) have been hampered by delays, and appear to have been deprioritised in comparison to costlier (though potentially less effective) areas, such as construction and civil works. This may have political motivations (tangible assets are more demonstrable from this perspective), potential compliance challenges, and could also be driven by donor preferences. This has the potential to undermine efforts to strengthen learning outcomes.

### Staff Training

Budgets for Staff Training, and associated targets, did not sufficiently account for the high levels of staff turnover within the Ministry and even within the GPE team. While this may have arisen, at least in part, from the unanticipated extension in the duration of the project, it is likely that this factor was partially overlooked, or underestimated, during the budgeting process.

Much capacity building and teacher training was not undertaken until close to the end of the Programme (late 2016, early 2017) minimising the potentially positive impact it could have on the Programme.

### Activity beyond Minimum Target Achievement

It appears that in some cases supported staff ceased activities as soon as (or even before) targets were reached; even in cases where marginal cost of delivery was zero or near zero, delivery was undertaken only so far as the results framework required. This almost certainly had an effect on the potential impact of programming.

### GPEPCU Status in MOE

GPE has not been fully and effectively integrated within the wider Ministry. There is a perception amongst stakeholders that it stands 'apart' from other aspects of programming – this has limited the extent to which those outside GPE are willing to take 'ownership' of GPE-initiated policies and/or programming.

### Key Policies and Strategies Completed Late

As a result of delays in decision-making, funding approvals, and disbursements, as well as other systemic coordination and communication issues, key policy approvals, and strategic priorities, have been completed behind schedule. This led to the launch of key programme activities, which were meant to be guided by these strategies and policies, being undertaken before any comprehensive plan or set of guidance had been created for them.

### Integration and Coordination of Aid Response and Actors

There have been some systemic issues with the 'integration' of GPE aid delivery with the wider work of the MOE, and other key international partners. In particular, there have been significant challenges with data-sharing, leading to duplication of efforts, or interventions undermined by a lack of supporting evidence to inform priorities. Likewise, this lack of integration has potentially exacerbated existing issues relating to 'territoriality' within the ministry and even in relation to the work being undertaken by other aid agencies, undermining shared 'ownership' and buy-in. Ongoing issues with communication and coordination have limited the awareness of key stakeholders as to the activities of partners across the country, raising the risk of duplicated efforts as well as minimising opportunities for effective cooperation to promote greater impact and efficiency among aid agencies.

### Foreign Programme Names and Terminology, and Local Suspicions

Stakeholders report that issues of nomenclature have potentially undermined local 'buy-in' to GPE initiatives, which have (as a result of naming practices and 'branding') been viewed by some parties as a 'separate' and 'foreign' initiative, rather than an integral part of the MOE. At the beginning, the GPE programme was presumed to collect intelligence data from the field and communities' reaction was to avoid attending and supporting the programme. After putting significant efforts by DSMs and PCs and conducting multiple public awareness campaigns on the purpose and effectiveness of the programme, it was cleared for the communities that it is different from data collection and coordination.

# 7  Key Recommendations

This section lists the Key Recommendations for future programming, drawing on the consultant's individual recommendations; additional recommendations, drawn from GTA's M&E report, and the Lessons Learned Consultancy, are also included below.

### Ensuring Sufficient Lead Time, Early Controls

Challenges encountered in starting Programme activities indicate the need to account for such delays in future intervention timelines. Similarly, ensuring tight control of new hires (building on the lessons learned above) will be important in early stages.

### Strengthen Monitoring and Evaluation

Effective M&E can be a driver of strong implementation. The insights offered by TPM implemented mid-intervention were useful tools for the Programme team. Building such activities into programme budgets can allow for evidence-based action to strengthen impact.

### Strengthen Impact Indicators

Ensuring programme activities and M&E are oriented toward impact, rather than out-puts, can further strengthen the lasting outcomes of interventions.

### Renewed Focus on Quality

Consider a shift in focus to teacher quality, and a reduction of expenditure on physical infrastructure; such approaches, while more challenging, have been demonstrated to impact substantially on national socio-economic development. This can include strengthening initiatives to promote relocation of qualified teachers to rural areas.

### Compliance and Transparency

Address issues of corruption, nepotism, and transparency, to reduce inefficiencies, and improve accountability, as well as the quality of programming. Such challenges have been identified across Afghanistan's education sector, and considered strategies to deal with such challenges will need to underpin future programme design.

### Working with The Private Sector

Consider the role of the private sector to augment work undertaken by government; where limited private sector provision exists, working to build national capacity in this regard can support the development of sustainable systems of education. PPP delivery models, with clear incentive structures, have the potential to secure impact in rural areas.

### Communication and Coordination of the Government and Aid Actors

Consider investing in the development of a coordination and communications platform to ensure all parties within the ministry are aware of what other partners are undertaking – however, this should only be considered if there will be real political backing for its long-term adoption and maintenance. Continuing those effective practices identified in previous sections of this document can serve as a starting point for future communication and coordination strategy design.

### Consider and Account for the Impact of Anti-Government Forces

Ensuring programmes are designed to minimise influence of these actors can be important; similarly, it may be important to take steps to minimise the legitimacy programmes may provide these actors.

### Local Branding and Nomenclature

Ensuring programmes have local branding, and staff use programme names and descriptions designed for local languages and customs, can minimise suspicions on the part of new beneficiaries.

### Linking Funds to Achievement

Throughout the programme, instances of fund disbursal with limited requirement for outputs resulted in challenges (e.g. cascaded training, and consultancy contracts). Future programmes may consider deliverable- and outcome-based payment mechanisms.

### Embedded Support in Finance and Procurement

Some success may be found in embedding staff in Procurement and Finance departments at central and provincial levels, ensuring there is sufficient capacity to process programme funds within specified timelines.

### Planning Contingencies

Programme design in many aid initiatives tends to be inflexible, not allowing for dynamic response to emergent challenges. Ensuring sufficient flexibility to respond is built into contracts and programme design, supported by strong anti-corruption measures, has the potential to support future programme success.

### Holistic Programme Design

Work on holistic programme design approach, especially in areas where one single activity of access to education will not produce long term positive results

### Continue Social Mobilisation

Continue social and community mobilization efforts as part of NESP III for long term social change; community involvement in education service delivery creates safety

from episodes of violence and school closures and hence, more investments should be made in this area.

### Strengthen Needs Assessment Data

Ensure needs assessment data is available before start of programme activities – the data should clarify what is needed, why, where, and how much will the required need cost, explore local options first

### Review Procurement Processes

A Ministry wide review of procurement processes and procedures is imperative for smooth implementation of other programme components. Chain of authority and decision making roles and responsibilities on the performance of contractors must be clearly laid out in advance.

### Strengthening CBE

CBE should continue to be a delivery mechanism for increasing access to education, however, sustainability, standardization, and simultaneous expansion of formal schools should remain strategic objectives of the Ministry. The payment process for CBE teachers along with formal teachers should be streamlined, subject to attendance as formal teachers. Revise CBE policy in light of lessons learned over the last years.

### Transition Issues

Ensure transition issues are considered as part of a programme package during the design phase; CBE, ALP classes require post-programme planning to ensure continuity for many students.

### Broader Consultation in Early Stages

Involve all stakeholders, particularly various departments of MOE and provincial offices, in the designing, planning, implementation, and monitoring of the new programme.  This will lead to greater ownership within the MOE (including provincial offices), and will improve coordination among various actors.  It will be important to clarify roles and responsibilities of all concerned departments.

### Community Ownership

Enhance community ownership of the programme, empower communities to take charge of the education of their children, and ensure the proper selection of SMS members who have genuine interest in the education of their children through a vigorous community mobilization and social organization process.

### Reconsider Role of NGOs

Reconsider the role of NGOs in the programme, which could lead to improved performance of the programme in all aspects, including development of policies and strategies; training of social mobilizers; formation and training of SMSs; designing

and timely implementation of SIPs based on priority community needs (including disbursement of school grants and their monitoring); reopening of closed schools (including administration of emergency grants); creating an enabling environment for teachers, including recruitment, training and deployment of QFTs, etc.

## System Component Recommendations

These recommendations focus on specific systemic points that might strengthen future delivery.

❖ Ensure the programme document has a logical framework which identifies key results and assigns responsible directorate

❖ Ensure programme document has needs assessment as a criterion for programme resource allocation

❖ Ensure programme document has a checklist for all guidelines and implementation manuals needed

❖ Ensure a process that rolls outs developed guidelines for application

❖ Clearly list out activities with responsible body specified – with clear terms of reference, and reporting mechanism

❖ Develop an implementation manual for the programme

❖ Ensure implementation details, timelines, budget, responsible body, reporting channel, and monitoring mechanism is detailed out

❖ Prepare a programme timeline of activities

❖ Prepare work breakdown structure

❖ Ensure budgeting is done through phase-out of activities

❖ Country-wide planning based on principle of equity and equal resource distribution

❖ Ensure a consultative process is in place that gathers info from directorates and incorporates those into the planning process

❖ Consultation should also be decentralized so that realities of each province are reflected in the programme design

❖ Ensure harmonization of all MOE plans and streamline GPE targets with MOE targets

❖ Clearly outline reporting requirements and reporting channels

❖ Ensure WBS and Implementation Manual outline all responsible bodies involved in the implementation

❖ Ensure an assessment of existing capacity is carried out to ensure there is a match between the expected level of output against the existing level of capacity

- ❖ Ensure programme budgeting is done in a way that matches AFMIS system and incorporates reporting at various levels to the extent possible

- ❖ Ensure financial procedures are aligned with AFMIS requirements and best practices that are simplified but ensure controls

- ❖ Ensure human resource needs assessments is carried out, with emphasis on salary scales that meet those of government policies such as CBR and NTA

- ❖ Include a Human Resource Capacity Development policy within the programme, with plans to develop sustainable capacity within the Ministry at central and provincial levels

- ❖ Ensure reporting mechanism and reporting channels are clearly laid out in the Programme Document

- ❖ Ensure data collection is embedded in Programme design and uses EMIS as the main body for data collection

- ❖ Invest in reporting capacity within the programme team, for data collection, analysis, and drafting of reports

- ❖ For transparency purposes, this practice should continue for all other programs, with addition of regular updates and key documentation of programme progress and financial details

- ❖ Ensure donor funded programs are aligned with AFMIS system

- ❖ Ensure there are simpler versions of the budget and workplan available for implementing directorates

- ❖ Ensure timely delivery on an M&E framework and plan that links with EMIS system for data collection and is harmonized across the ministry

- ❖ Ensure external audit is outsourced in future programming

- ❖ Ensure SE and GPE agreements are completed simultaneously with programme development

- ❖ Ensure there is harmonization of budget lines between Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) and Programme Budget Lines

# 8  Annexes

## Consolidated Output Tables

## Programme Priority 1: Strengthen Community and Social Mobilisation and Governance Systems at the Local Level

Strategy 1.1: Enhance community and social mobilisation

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | Develop training material and guidelines for social mobilizers, including linkages with two other Programme Priorities (multiple pathways and female teachers) | Targets | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Achievements | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
|  |  | Variance | - | - | (1) | - | - | - |
|  | Programme Target 2 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.2 | Salary and communication & transportation allowances for 120 social mobilizers | Targets | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 77 | - |
|  |  | Achievements | 111 | 96 | 91 | 109 | 75 | - |
|  | Programme Target 120 | Variance | 9 | 24 | 29 | 11 | 2 | - |
|  |  | Variance % | 8% | 20% | 24% | 9% | 3% | 0% |
| 1.1.3 | Training of social mobilizers (review workshop /refresher training) | Targets | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
|  |  | Achievements | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
|  | Programme Target 3 | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.4 | Salary and Communication & transportation cost for 13 Provincial Social Mobilization Coordinators | Targets | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | - |
|  |  | Achievements | 13 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 12 | - |
|  | Programme Target 13 | Variance | - | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | - |
|  |  | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 8% | 15% | 8% | 0% |
| 1.1.5 | Conduct bi-monthly meetings among social mobilizers, DEO and PED (6 meetings/year for 13 province) / Quarterly Review Workshops at Central level | Targets | 78 | 78 | 78 | 3 | 2 | - |
|  |  | Achievements | 33 | 43 | 43 | 1 | 2 | - |
|  |  | Variance | 45 | 35 | 35 | 2 | - | - |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Programme Target 234 | Variance % | 58% | 45% | 45% | 67% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.6 | Develop advocacy material and engagement guidelines | Targets | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.7 | Organize regular events at district and provincial level on awareness for education (8 events/year/province) / Field Monitoring Visits at provincial level | Targets | 149 | 106 | 104 | 1,080 | 120 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 47 | 63 | 50 | 103 | 80 | - |
| | | Variance | 102 | 43 | 54 | 977 | 40 | - |
| | Programme Target 318 | Variance % | 68% | 41% | 52% | 90% | 33% | 0% |
| 1.1.8 | Develop communication strategy based on the needs and subsequently review | Targets | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | $1^{21}$ | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.9 | Communication strategy implemented as per plan | Targets | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 1.2. Strengthen school governance for quality schools

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.2.1 | Train SMS on participatory SIP development | Targets | - | 600 | 400 | 414 | 200 | - |
| | Programme Target 1000 | Achieve-ments | - | 205 | 356 | 131 | 200 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 395 | 44 | 283 | - | - |

[21] Draft completed – awaiting review and approval.

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 66% | 11% | 68% | 0% | 0% |
| **1.2.2** | Provide school grants for SIP implementation | Targets | 200 | 600 | 400 | 599 | 438 | 640 |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | 131 | 117 | 329 | 203 | 359 |
| | Programme Target 1000 | Variance | 200 | 469 | 283 | 270 | 235 | 281 |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 78% | 71% | 45% | 54% | 44% |
| **1.2.3** | Provision of hiring Engi-neers to implement SIPs as identified.-Engi-neers Salaries | Targets | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 16 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 15 | - |
| | Programme Target 16 | Variance | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 13% | 6% | 0% |

# Programme Priority 2: Expand and Reinforce Multiple Pathways to Education

Strategy 2.1: Expand Access to Community-based Education (CBE) and Accelerated Learning Pro-grammes (ALP)

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2.1.1** | Use school mapping tools to identify under-served areas where CBE classes are re-quired | Targets | 1,200 | 1,200 | 622 | - | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 894 | 584 | 622 | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 306 | 616 | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2100 | Variance % | 26% | 51% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.1.2** | Facilitate enrolment of students who are en-rolled in schools / School kits for CBE stu-dents (will be pur-chased on provincial level) | Targets | 9,000 | 27,000 | 27,000 | 63,000 | 42,000 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 24,414 | 12,883 | 11,860 | 58,503 | 29,279 | - |
| | | Variance | (15,414) | 14,117 | 15,140 | 4,497 | 12,721 | - |
| | Programme Target 63000 | Variance % | -171% | 52% | 56% | 7% | 30% | 0% |
| **2.1.3** | Recruit qualified teach-ers from the villages - | Targets | 300 | 900 | 900 | 351 | 1,290 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 870 | 487 | 457 | 289 | 1,290 | - |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Salaries of CBE Teachers | Variance | (570) | 413 | 443 | 62 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2100 | Variance % | -190% | 46% | 49% | 18% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.1.4** | Train qualified teachers from the villages - CBEs | Targets | - | 900 | 900 | 2,100 | - | - |
| | | Achievements | - | - | - | 1,588 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2100 | Variance | - | 900 | 900 | 512 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 100% | 24% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.1.5** | Use school mapping tools to identify underserved areas where ALP are required | Targets | 1,200 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Achievements | 668 | 590 | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2100 | Variance | 532 | (590) | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 44% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.1.6** | Facilitate enrolment of over-age students who are enrolled in schools - School kits for ALP students (will be purchased on provincial level) | Targets | 10,000 | 10,000 | 2,035 | 20,000 | 11,250 | - |
| | | Achievements | 9,904 | 7,500 | 2,035 | 19,461 | 8,550 | - |
| | | Variance | 96 | 2,500 | - | 539 | 2,700 | - |
| | Programme Target 20000 | Variance % | 1% | 25% | 0% | 3% | 24% | 0% |
| **2.1.7** | Recruit qualified teachers from the village - Salaries of ALP Teachers | Targets | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 440 | - |
| | | Achievements | 382 | 280 | 360 | 342 | 440 | - |
| | Programme Target 800 | Variance | 18 | 120 | 40 | 58 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 5% | 30% | 10% | 15% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.1.8** | Train qualified teachers from the village - ALPs | Targets | - | 400 | - | 800 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 800 | Achievements | - | - | - | 533 | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 400 | - | 267 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 0% | 33% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 2.2: Strengthen Mosque-based Education (MBE)

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.3.1 | Develop strategy for MBE | Targets | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Achievements | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2.3.2 | Train mullahs in pedagogy and teaching basic reading and numeracy skills / MBE Trainings | Targets | - | - | - | 4,403 | - | - |
| | | Achievements | - | - | - | 2,045 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 6000 | Variance | - | - | - | 2,358 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | #DIV/0! | 0% | 54% | 0% | 0% |
| 2.3.2.1 | Recruit the mullahs to teach in the Mosque-Salaries of Mullahs Imams | Targets | 500 | 2,500 | 3,000 | 2,418 | 79 | - |
| | | Achievements | 891 | 647 | 1,985 | 1,450 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 6000 | Variance | (391) | 1,853 | 1,015 | 968 | 79 | - |
| | | Variance % | -78% | 74% | 34% | 40% | 100% | 0% |
| 2.3.3 | Number of MBE students enrolled and Provide textbooks and learning material to students. | Targets | 10,000 | 50,000 | 60,000 | 48,360 | - | - |
| | | Achievements | 22,311 | 14,923 | 47,750 | 42,820 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 120000 | Variance | (12,311) | 35,077 | 12,250 | 5,540 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | -123% | 70% | 20% | 11% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 2.3: Reopen schools

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.4.1 | Organize meetings and focus group discussions for reopening of schools (provincial activity) | Targets | 9 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 100 | - |
| | | Achievements | 9 | 22 | - | 29 | 50 | - |
| | Programme Target 600 | Variance | - | 278 | 300 | 271 | 50 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 93% | 100% | 90% | 50% | 0% |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2.4.2** | Develop simple mecha-nism for the utilization of emergency fund | Targets | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.4.3** | Mobilize SMS for the utilization of emergency fund for reopening of closed schools | Targets | - | 150 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 300 | Variance | - | 150 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

# Programme Priority 3: Increase the Number of Qualified Female Teachers in Areas with High Gender Disparities

Strategy 3.1. Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **3.1.1** | Develop communication and social support strat-egy engaging SMS, com-munity leaders and elders, DEO and PED for female teachers and girls' educa-tion | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2 | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 3.2. Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **3.2.1** | Undertake recruitment campaign | Targets | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **3.2.2** | | Targets | 120 | - | - | 300 | - | - |

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| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Provide two-week orientation training for female teachers identified and recruited for deployment | Achievements | - | - | - | 231 | - | - |
| | | Variance | 120 | - | - | 69 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 300 | Variance % | 100% | 0% | 0% | 23% | 0% | 0% |
| 3.2.3 | Develop incentive strategy (couple and team deployment; deployment bonus; salary bonus; choices for extension and redeployment; etc.) | Targets | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Achievements | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance % | 100% | 0% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| 3.2.4 | Recruitment and contract qualified female teachers | Targets | 120 | 180 | 300 | 300 | 205 | - |
| | Programme Target 300 | Achievements | 117 | 25 | 162 | 231 | 205 | - |
| | | Variance | 3 | 155 | 138 | 69 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 3% | 86% | 46% | 23% | 0% | 0% |
| 3.2.5 | Deploy female teachers along with their spouses in 40 districts | Targets | - | - | - | 138 | 53 | - |
| | | Achievements | - | - | - | 74 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 300 | Variance | - | - | - | 64 | 53 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 46% | 100% | 0% |

# Programme Priority 4: Streamline Policy and Administrative Systems in the Ministry of Education

Strategy 4.1. Enhance policy review and development

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1.1 | Develop strategy for policy review, development and dissemination in the MOE, including clear division of tasks; processes; training program; monitoring - Salaries of international consultants | Targets | - | 1 | - | 2 | 1 | - |
| | | Achievements | - | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | 1 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 50% | 0% | 0% |

| 4.1.2 | Implement strategy for policy review and development | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2 | Variance | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | #DIV/0! | 0% |
| 4.1.3 | Conduct assessment to identify priority areas for review and development of policies, procedures and standards for the concern department under the MOE | Targets | | | | | | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | | | | | | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 0 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | #DIV/0! | 0% |
| 4.1.4 | Engage National Technical Advisors to review and develop policies, procedures and standards related to the three other programme priorities: community and social mobilization; school governance; multiple pathways to education and transition from formal to non-formal; increasing the number of qualified female teachers and enhancing girls' secondary education-Salaries of 4 National Technical Consultants for policy development | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | 1 | 4 | 4 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| | Programme Target 2 | | | | | | | |
| 4.1.5 | Provide equipment to the Academic Council and the Technical Advisors | Targets | - | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| | Programme Target 2 | Variance | - | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 4.1.6 | Disseminate and communicate policies, procedures and standards | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2 | Variance | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% |

Strategy 4.2. Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.2.1** | Develop/revise training programme for planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.2.2** | Salary for the master train-ers recruited to train the staff of the MOE. | Targets | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | - |
| | Programme Target 8 | Variance | - | - | - | - | 1 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 11% | 0% |
| **4.2.3** | Train DEO and PED, pro-vincial planning and evalu-ation Officers on planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. | Targets | 80 | 160 | - | 1 | 110 | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | 80 | - | - | - | 110 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 160 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 240 | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.2.4** | Salary for the TAs to men-tor civil servants in related programme Directorates in implementation of 3 first Programme Priorities un-der the Planning & Evalua-tion Directorate. | Targets | | | | | | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | | | | | | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 0 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.2.5** | Assess responsiveness of EMIS to M&E needs of MOE and partners at dis-trict, provincial and central levels | Targets | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Achieve-ments | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Target 2 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.2.6** | | Targets | 8 | 16 | 16 | 13 | 12 | - |

| | | | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Salary for the system developers and IT analyst to develop further systems and modules for EMIS at central and provincial levels. | Achievements | 8 | 15 | 15 | 12 | 12 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 6% | 6% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| | Programme Target 16 | | | | | | | |
| **4.2.7** | Equipment and running cost for the EMIS module development | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | - |
| | | Achievements | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance | - | 1 | - | - | 3 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 100% | 0% |
| **4.2.8** | Develop an integrated system that includes school and spot surveys and other third-party testing and assessments in EMIS | Targets | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | Achievements | - | - | - | - | 1 | - |
| | Programme Target 1 | Variance | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 4.3. Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.3.1** | Implement resource mobilization function/Salary for the member of the unit for 6 months | Targets | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | - |
| | | Achievements | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | - |
| | Programme Target 9 | Variance | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 1 | - |
| | | Variance % | 11% | 11% | 22% | 0% | 11% | 0% |
| **4.3.2** | Provide for operation and equipment/Establishment cost for the coordination unit such as office set-up, furniture, communication, etc. | Targets | 8 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 2 | - |
| | | Achievements | 8 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 3 | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| | Programme Target 8 | Variance % | 0% | 38% | 50% | 0% | 50% | 0% |
| **4.3.3** | | Targets | - | 1 | - | 6 | 6 | - |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Develop strategy/TORs for PMCU and Rally MOE departments to endorse strategy/Capacity development of the GPE Coordination Team. | Achievements | - | - | - | - | 3 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 1 | - | 6 | 3 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 50% | 0% |
| | Programme Target 1 | | | | | | | |
| **4.3.4** | Implement internal and external management coordination function/ Provide support to Finance and Accounting Department, Procurement Department, Human Recourses Management Unit and Academic Supervision Department. | Targets | 12 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 13 | - |
| | | Achievements | 12 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 13 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 4 | 1 | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 33% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| | Programme Target 12 | | | | | | | |

# Consolidated Budget Tables

## Programme Priority 1: Strengthen Community and Social Mobilisation and Governance Systems at the Local Level

Strategy 1.1: Enhance community and social mobilisation

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | Develop training material and guidelines for social mobilizers, including linkages with two other Programme Priorities (multiple pathways and female teachers) | Budget | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 0 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.2 | Salary and communication & transportation allowances for 120 social mobilizers | Budget | 440,738 | 720,000 | 720,000 | 676,500 | 261,090 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 442,575 | 633,459 | 508,718 | 569,860 | 252,481 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 1,880,738 | Variance | (1,837) | 86,541 | 211,282 | 106,640 | 8,609 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 12% | 29% | 16% | 3% | 0% |
| 1.1.3 | Training of social mobilizers (review workshop /refresher training) | Budget | 65,117 | 152,100 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | 65,117 | 75,036 | 70,035 | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 217,217 | Variance | - | 77,064 | (70,035) | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 51% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 1.1.4 | Salary and Communication & transportation cost for 13 Provincial Social Mobilization Coordinators | Budget | 160,107 | 163,800 | 163,800 | 160,650 | 117,985 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 160,108 | 155,562 | 141,045 | 138,836 | 66,824 | - |
| | | Variance | (1) | 8,238 | 22,755 | 21,814 | 51,161 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 487,707 | Variance % | 0% | 5% | 14% | 14% | 43% | 0% |
| 1.1.5 | Conduct bi-monthly meetings among social mobilizers, DEO and PED (6 meetings/year for 13 province) / Quarterly Review Workshops at | Budget | 2,299 | 15,600 | 15,600 | 27,966 | 24,000 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 2,298 | 21,339 | 4,497 | 9,368 | 24,867 | - |
| | | Variance | 1 | (5,739) | 11,103 | 18,598 | (867) | - |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Central level Programme Budget US$ 33,499 | Variance % | 0% | -37% | 71% | 67% | -4% | 0% |
| **1.1.6** | Develop advocacy material and engagement guidelines | Budget | 5,000 | 5,000 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 5,000 | Variance | 5,000 | 5,000 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **1.1.7** | Organize regular events at district and provincial level on awareness for education (8 events/year/province) / Field Monitoring Visits at provincial level | Budget | 147,101 | 381,600 | 381,600 | 209,520 | 23,280 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 147,101 | 192,568 | 171,168 | 18,725 | 14,419 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 189,032 | 210,432 | 190,795 | 8,861 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 910,301 | Variance % | 0% | 50% | 55% | 91% | 38% | 0% |
| **1.1.8** | Develop communication strategy based on the needs and subsequently review | Budget | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 75,000 | Variance | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| **1.1.9** | Communication strategy implemented as per plan | Budget | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 150,000 | Variance | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 1.2. Strengthen school governance for quality schools

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1.2.1** | Train SMS on participatory SIP development | Budget | - | 120,000 | 80,000 | 82,800 | 40,000 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | 23,444 | 69,315 | 25,014 | 39,399 | - |
| | Programme | Variance | - | 96,556 | 10,685 | 57,786 | 601 | - |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Budget US$ 200,000 | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 80% | 13% | 70% | 2% | 0% |
| **1.2.2** | Provide school grants for SIP implementation | Budget | 1,970,000 | 10,969,410 | 7,312,940 | 9,508,793 | 10,315,022 | 5,918,758 |
| | | Expenditure | - | 4,195,015 | 1,242,234 | 3,325,078 | 2,752,247 | 3,347,838 |
| | Programme Budget US$ 18,282,350 | Variance | 1,970,000 | 6,774,395 | 6,070,706 | 6,183,715 | 7,562,775 | 2,570,920 |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 62% | 83% | 65% | 73% | 44% |
| **1.2.3** | Provision of hiring Engineers to implement SIPs as identified.-Engineers Salaries | Budget | 49,931 | 316,200 | 158,100 | 230,400 | 138,277 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 49,931 | 276,760 | 242,369 | 219,396 | 118,232 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 39,440 | (84,269) | 11,004 | 20,045 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 524,231 | Variance % | 0% | 12% | -53% | 5% | 14% | 0% |

# Programme Priority 2: Expand and Reinforce Multiple Pathways to Education

Strategy 2.1: Expand Access to Community-based Education (CBE) and Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP)

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2.1.1** | Use school mapping tools to identify underserved areas where CBE classes are required | Budget | 26,051 | 69,949 | 18,961 | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | 26,050 | 36,222 | 18,961 | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 1 | 33,727 | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 96,000 | Variance % | 0% | 48% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.1.2** | Facilitate enrolment of students who are enrolled in schools / School kits for CBE students (will be purchased on provincial level) | Budget | 212,465 | 540,000 | 945,000 | 945,000 | 630,000 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 212,465 | 365,805 | 573,071 | 646,376 | 463,758 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 174,195 | 371,929 | 298,624 | 166,242 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 1,697,465 | Variance % | 0% | 32% | 39% | 32% | 26% | 0% |
| **2.1.3** | Recruit qualified teachers from the villages - | Budget | - | 2,527,200 | 3,780,000 | 3,622,050 | 1,573,810 | - |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Salaries of CBE Teachers | Expenditure | - | 1,202,524 | 2,292,463 | 2,411,455 | 1,457,646 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 6,307,200 | Variance | - | 1,324,676 | 1,487,537 | 1,210,595 | 116,165 | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 52% | 39% | 33% | 7% | 0% |
| 2.1.4 | Train qualified teachers from the villages - CBEs | Budget | - | 204,000 | 153,000 | 357,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | 170,801 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 357,000 | Variance | - | 204,000 | 153,000 | 186,199 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 100% | 52% | 0% | 0% |
| 2.1.5 | Use school mapping tools to identify under-served areas where ALP are required | Budget | 7,142 | 88,858 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | 7,142 | 17,622 | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 96,000 | Variance | - | 71,236 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 80% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2.1.6 | Facilitate enrolment of over-age students who are enrolled in schools - School kits for ALP students (will be purchased on provincial level) | Budget | 141,447 | 620,000 | 620,000 | 620,000 | 348,750 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 141,447 | 388,810 | 447,902 | 444,293 | 339,166 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 231,190 | 172,098 | 175,707 | 9,584 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 1,381,447 | Variance % | 0% | 37% | 28% | 28% | 3% | 0% |
| 2.1.7 | Recruit qualified teachers from the village - Salaries of ALP Teachers | Budget | - | 1,610,100 | 1,440,000 | 1,397,250 | 475,238 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | 742,192 | 1,013,439 | 1,043,300 | 457,125 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 3,050,100 | Variance | - | 867,908 | 426,561 | 353,950 | 18,114 | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 54% | 30% | 25% | 4% | 0% |
| 2.1.8 | Train qualified teachers from the village - ALPs | Budget | - | 136,000 | - | 136,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | 58,567 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 136,000 | Variance | - | 136,000 | - | 77,433 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 0% | 57% | 0% | 0% |

## Strategy 2.2: Strengthen Mosque-based Education (MBE)

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.3.1 | Develop strategy for MBE | Budget | 20,000 | 20,000 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 20,000 | Variance | 20,000 | 20,000 | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2.3.2 | Train mullahs in pedagogy and teaching basic reading and numeracy skills / MBE Trainings | Budget | - | - | - | 440,300 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | 173,596 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 550,000 | Variance | - | - | - | 266,704 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | #DIV/0! | 0% | 61% | 0% | 0% |
| 2.3.2.1 | Recruit the mullahs to teach in the Mosque- Salaries of Mullahs Imams | Budget | 70,207 | 1,822,750 | 2,100,000 | 1,981,350 | 45,030 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 40,206 | 546,173 | 946,325 | 1,013,321 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 3,412,957 | Variance | 30,001 | 1,276,577 | 1,153,675 | 968,029 | 45,030 | - |
| | | Variance % | 43% | 70% | 55% | 49% | 100% | 0% |
| 2.3.3 | Number of MBE students enrolled and Provide textbooks and learning material to students. | Budget | 33,581 | 250,000 | 300,000 | 241,800 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | 33,581 | 106,162 | 238,399 | 167,782 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 583,581 | Variance | - | 143,838 | 61,601 | 74,018 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 58% | 21% | 31% | 0% | 0% |

## Strategy 2.3: Reopen schools

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.4.1 | Organize meetings and focus group discussions for reopening of schools (provincial activity) | Budget | 4,080 | 180,000 | 180,000 | 60,000 | 20,000 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 4,081 | 8,747 | - | 5,800 | 10,537 | - |
| | | Variance | (1) | 171,253 | 180,000 | 54,200 | 9,463 | - |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Programme Budget US$ 364,080 | Variance % | 0% | 95% | 100% | 90% | 47% | 0% |
| **2.4.2** | Develop simple mechanism for the utilization of emergency fund | Budget | - | 10,000 | - | 10,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 10,000 | Variance | - | 10,000 | - | 10,000 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| **2.4.3** | Mobilize SMS for the utilization of emergency fund for reopening of closed schools | Budget | - | 675,000 | - | 10,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 675,000 | - | 10,000 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 1,350,000 | Variance % | #DIV/0! | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

## Programme Priority 3: Increase the Number of Qualified Female Teachers in Areas with High Gender Disparities

Strategy 3.1. Develop social support systems for female teachers at the local level

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **3.1.1** | Develop communication and social support strategy engaging SMS, community leaders and elders, DEO and PED for female teachers and girls' education<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 15,000 | Budget | - | 7,500 | 7,500 | 15,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 7,500 | 7,500 | 15,000 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

Strategy 3.2. Recruit, train and deploy female teachers from urban centres to the local level

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **3.2.1** | Undertake recruitment campaign<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 10,000 | Budget | 5,000 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 5,000 | - | - | - | - | - |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Variance % | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **3.2.2** | Provide two-week orientation training for female teachers identified and recruited for deployment<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 150,000 | Budget | 43,200 | - | - | 150,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | 15,588 | - | - | 19,165 | - | - |
| | | Variance | 27,612 | - | - | 130,835 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 64% | 0% | 0% | 87% | 0% | 0% |
| **3.2.3** | Develop incentive strategy (couple and team deployment; deployment bonus; salary bonus; choices for extension and redeployment; etc.)<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 5,000 | Budget | 5,000 | - | - | 5,000 | - | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | 5,000 | - | - | 5,000 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 100% | 0% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| **3.2.4** | Recruitment and contract qualified female teachers<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 6,140,696 | Budget | 239,096 | 3,420,600 | 2,885,000 | 2,548,800 | 1,664,272 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 239,097 | 1,219,329 | 1,009,070 | 1,427,031 | 1,600,744 | - |
| | | Variance | (1) | 2,201,271 | 1,875,930 | 1,121,769 | 63,528 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 64% | 65% | 44% | 4% | 0% |
| **3.2.5** | Deploy female teachers along with their spouses in 40 districts<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 239,000 | Budget | - | - | - | 138,000 | 191,000 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | 74,358 | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | 138,000 | 116,642 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 100% | 61% | 0% |

# Programme Priority 4: Streamline Policy and Administrative Systems in the Ministry of Education

Strategy 4.1. Enhance policy review and development

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.1.1** | Develop strategy for policy review, development and dissemination in the MOE, including clear division of tasks; pro- | Budget | - | 370,000 | 2,520 | 120,000 | 96,100 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | 21,000 | 2,520 | 18,000 | 71,502 | - |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | cesses; training program; monitoring - Salaries of international consultants | Variance | - | 349,000 | - | 102,000 | 24,598 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 370,000 | Variance % | 0% | 94% | 0% | 85% | 26% | 0% |
| **4.1.2** | Implement strategy for policy review and development | Budget | - | 2,500 | 2,500 | 5,000 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 5,000 | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 2,500 | 2,500 | 5,000 | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | #DIV/0! | 0% |
| **4.1.3** | Conduct assessment to identify priority areas for review and development of policies, procedures and standards for the concern department under the MOE | Budget | | | | | | - |
| | | Expenditure | | | | | | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 0 | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.1.4** | Engage National Technical Advisors to review and develop policies, procedures and standards related to the three other programme priorities: community and social mobilization; school governance; multiple pathways to education and transition from formal to non-formal; increasing the number of qualified female teachers and enhancing girls' secondary education-Salaries of 4 National Technical Consultants for policy development | Budget | - | 144,000 | 144,000 | 128,700 | 55,202 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | 14,971 | 52,306 | 70,883 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 144,000 | 129,029 | 76,394 | (15,681) | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 90% | 59% | -28% | 0% |
| | Programme Budget US$ 288,000 | | | | | | | |
| **4.1.5** | Provide equipment to the Academic Council and the Technical Advisors | Budget | - | 100,000 | - | 47,561 | 44,074 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | 52,439 | 1,540 | 47,651 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 100,000 | Variance | - | 100,000 | (52,439) | 46,021 | (3,577) | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 97% | -8% | 0% |
| **4.1.6** | | Budget | - | 10,000 | 10,000 | 20,000 | 10,000 | - |

| | Disseminate and communicate policies, procedures and stand-ards | Expendi-ture | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Variance | - | 10,000 | 10,000 | 20,000 | 10,000 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 20,000 | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% |

## Strategy 4.2. Strengthen MOE capacity for improved planning and monitoring

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.2.1** | Develop/revise training programme for planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting | Budget | - | 20,000 | 10,000 | - | - | - |
| | | Expendi-ture | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 30,000 | Variance | - | 20,000 | 10,000 | - | - | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.2.2** | Salary for the master trainers recruited to train the staff of the MOE. | Budget | 82,862 | 139,200 | 139,200 | 139,200 | 86,449 | - |
| | | Expendi-ture | 82,862 | 115,934 | 118,040 | 115,671 | 76,909 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 361,262 | Variance | - | 23,266 | 21,160 | 23,529 | 9,541 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 17% | 15% | 17% | 11% | 0% |
| **4.2.3** | Train DEO and PED, provincial planning and evaluation Officers on planning, monitoring , evaluation and reporting. | Budget | 62,196 | 200,000 | 288,000 | 119,751 | 70,150 | - |
| | | Expendi-ture | 62,196 | - | 1,274 | - | 70,655 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 550,196 | Variance | - | 200,000 | 286,726 | 119,751 | (505) | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | -1% | 0% |
| **4.2.4** | Salary for the TAs to mentor civil servants in related programme Di-rectorates in implemen-tation of 3 first Pro-gramme Priorities under the Planning & Evalua-tion Directorate. | Budget | | | | | | - |
| | | Expendi-ture | | | | | | - |
| | | Variance | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 0 | Variance % | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| **4.2.5** | | Budget | - | 150,000 | - | 285,656 | - | - |

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Assess responsiveness of EMIS to M&E needs of MOE and partners at district, provincial and central levels | Expenditure | - | 47,589 | 71,383 | 118,973 | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 102,411 | (71,383) | 166,683 | - | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 150,000 | Variance % | 0% | 68% | 0% | 58% | 0% | 0% |
| 4.2.6 | Salary for the system developers and IT analyst to develop further systems and modules for EMIS at central and provincial levels. | Budget | 64,483 | 307,200 | 307,200 | 226,200 | 142,568 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 64,483 | 297,985 | 221,687 | 188,800 | 134,521 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 9,215 | 85,513 | 37,400 | 8,047 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 678,883 | Variance % | 0% | 3% | 28% | 17% | 6% | 0% |
| 4.2.7 | Equipment and running cost for the EMIS module development | Budget | - | 1,027,500 | 616,500 | 510,000 | 337,160 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 1,644,000 | Expenditure | - | - | 187,365 | 176,581 | - | - |
| | | Variance | - | 1,027,500 | 429,135 | 333,419 | 337,160 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 70% | 65% | 100% | 0% |
| 4.2.8 | Develop an integrated system that includes school and spot surveys and other third-party testing and assessments in EMIS | Budget | - | 360,000 | 120,000 | 724,700 | 724,700 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | 664,392 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 360,000 | 120,000 | 724,700 | 60,308 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 480,000 | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 8% | 0% |

Strategy 4.3. Strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilisation function in the MOE

| Budget Line | Activity Description | Progress | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.3.1 | Implement resource mobilization function/Salary for the member of the unit for 6 months | Budget | 288,000 | 288,000 | 288,000 | 237,282 | 117,817 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 250,067 | 260,766 | 207,628 | 189,053 | 96,337 | - |
| | Programme Budget US$ 826,067 | Variance | 37,933 | 27,234 | 80,372 | 48,229 | 21,480 | - |
| | | Variance % | 13% | 9% | 28% | 20% | 18% | 0% |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **4.3.2** | Provide for operation and equipment/Establishment cost for the coordination unit such as office set-up, furniture, communication, etc.<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 441,512 | Budget | 43,012 | 250,000 | 148,501 | 220,000 | 130,375 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 48,207 | 132,300 | 56,241 | 77,251 | 84,225 | - |
| | | Variance | (5,195) | 117,700 | 92,260 | 142,749 | 46,150 | - |
| | | Variance % | -12% | 47% | 62% | 65% | 35% | 0% |
| **4.3.3** | Develop strategy/TORs for PMCU and Rally MOE departments to endorse strategy/Capacity development of the GPE Coordination Team.<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 40,000 | Budget | - | 40,000 | - | 60,000 | 60,000 | - |
| | | Expenditure | - | - | - | - | 42,477 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 40,000 | - | 60,000 | 17,523 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 29% | 0% |
| **4.3.4** | Implement internal and external management coordination function/ Provide support to Finance and Accounting Department, Procurement Department, Human Recourses Management Unit and Academic Supervision Department.<br><br>Programme Budget US$ 599,512 | Budget | 23,464 | 288,024 | 288,024 | 242,136 | 129,081 | - |
| | | Expenditure | 23,464 | 190,150 | 189,137 | 183,498 | 122,269 | - |
| | | Variance | - | 97,874 | 98,887 | 58,638 | 6,812 | - |
| | | Variance % | 0% | 34% | 34% | 24% | 5% | 0% |